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ABSTRACT 
 
Vulnerability Assessment of Water Supply Systems 
for Insufficient Fire Flows. (December 2006) 
Lufthansa Rahman Kanta, B.S., Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kelly Brumbelow 
 
 
 
 Water supply systems’ vulnerability towards physical, chemical, biological, and 
cyber threats was recognized and was under study long before September 11, 2001. But 
greater attention toward security measures for water supply systems was focused after 
the incidents of September 11, 2001. In response to those events, several acts have been 
passed by the United States Congress, and numerous vulnerability assessment tools and 
methodologies for water systems have been developed. Although water supply systems 
are vulnerable to many forms of terrorist acts, most of the vulnerability analysis studies 
on these systems have been for chemical and biological threats.  Because of the 
interdependency of water supply infrastructure and emergency fire response, any 
substantial damage in a water system would be a significant threat towards the 
community. 
In this study, attention is focused toward physical threats on water supply 
systems during a fire flow condition, and a methodology is developed to determine the 
vulnerable components of a water supply system during a fire event.  The methodology 
utilizes dynamic programming optimization procedure to determine maximized 
 iv
disruption of fire flows as a function of number of attacks and/or failures in the water 
distribution system.  Disruption is quantified at specific fire hydrants in two schemes 
using normalized values of (1) available flow and (2) available pressure and distance to 
the nearest operational fire hydrant.  It is found that the pressure-based quantity is 
inferior to the flow-based one.  However, using the flow-based disruption metric, clear 
functions of disruption versus failure number can be determined that exhibit discernable 
properties of robustness and resiliency – and the sequential failures in each.   
This methodology is applied to the water supply system of Micropolis, a virtual 
city developed by Brumbelow et al. (2005), and vulnerability analysis is performed with 
fire at several possible locations. On the basis of the results, three mitigation strategies 
are proposed to harden specific sets of water mains and more simulations are performed 
on the hardened water supply system to assess its changed vulnerability. The results 
from the simulations of the mitigation strategies show that the recommendations on 
specific mitigation measures reduce the serious consequences from such threats. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.Background 
 
 Water systems are spatially diverse and are naturally vulnerable to physical, 
chemical/biological, and cyber threats. These types of threats might be caused by natural 
disaster and/or malevolent actions such as terrorist attack, vandalism or insider sabotage, 
and may cause serious consequences. The nature and degree of these threats to water 
systems vary mostly with the geographical location, population of the region, and 
accessibility of the system components. These threats towards water systems had been 
recognized long before September 11, 2001 and the water utility industry had taken 
some security measures against such threats, but not as many as since September 11, 
2001. Water supply infrastructure is also connected to the critical infrastructures of 
electrical power, transportation, chemical industry, emergency services such as fire 
response, etc. Thus, any potential damage in water supply infrastructure would be a 
threat to those infrastructures as well, and vice versa. 
 In response to the events of September 11, 2001, attention has been drawn to the 
security issues of water infrastructure throughout the Unites States. Within a very short 
time after September 11, 2001, a number of acts were passed by the United States 
Congress such as the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-288) and Homeland  
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Security Act (P.L. 107-297) that addressed the nation’s water supply and water quality 
infrastructures and required vulnerability assessments to be performed to evaluate the 
potential threats towards those systems and to identify the corrective actions that might 
help to reduce or to mitigate the risk of serious consequences from adversarial actions. 
These acts also designated the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) 
as a lead federal agency to establish security measures and to safeguard water supplies 
from terrorist attacks and other malevolent actions. In response, USEPA has developed 
several vulnerability assessment methodologies/tools in association with other partner 
agencies such as American Water Works Association (AWWA), Department of 
Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories, Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies 
(AMSA) and various other agencies. Continuous studies and development of 
vulnerability assessment methodologies have been in progress by various public and 
private organizations, universities, researchers and students throughout the country since 
then. 
 
1.2.Motivation of the Current Research 
 
Water supply systems are generally constructed to provide sufficient water to the 
users with a specified pressure, quantity and quality. These systems consist of various 
major components like, pipes, valves, junctions, pumps, elevated storage tanks, water 
treatment plants, etc. The three competing goals for the water supply systems are: (1) 
reliable delivery of water even in case of emergencies like pipe failures, power outages, 
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and, fires, (2) efficient and economic operation of the system, and, (3) meeting water 
quality standards mandated by USEPA (Mays 1996). These goals can be achieved by 
providing security against natural hazards and/or terrorist attacks and also by proper 
operation and maintenance of the system. The major maintenance activities in the water 
supply system include maintenance of the pumps, leak detection in the pipes, testing fire 
hydrants and valves, flushing the water mains, etc. Most of the system components are 
generally durable and can function for a long period of time without maintenance; but, if 
a single component fails because of mechanical malfunction or terrorist attack, it can 
hamper one or more of system’s objectives. The repairing or replacing of damaged 
components generally takes a couple of days, but during this period the system must 
have adequate supply of water in the storage tanks to consistently provide water to the 
customers. The reason for this additional storage of water is the emergency services for 
fire response depend upon the fire suppression capacity of the water supply system. 
Thus, in case of fire, the system must provide adequate water with sufficient pressure for 
a certain period of time. If multiple main breaks or leakages occur during fire, the system 
might not provide water to suppress fire with required flow and pressure.  
The present research of vulnerability assessment of the water supply system was 
inspired by the need to find out the most critical components/pipes of a water supply 
system during fire events. Using the dynamic programming optimization technique a 
methodology has been developed to determine the critical components/water mains of 
the system that maximize the damage caused by fire in the system. Knowing those 
critical system components a few mitigation strategies have been proposed like 
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hardening those pipes, increasing security measures around those critical components, 
etc., so that the system can perform adequately when fire occurs in the system. 
  
1.3.Organization of Thesis Sections 
 
The present section has explained the need for vulnerability assessment of the 
water supply system during fire flow condition. Section 2 explains the concept of critical 
infrastructures and how the government of the United States addresses protection of 
those critical infrastructures. Section 2 also reviews various vulnerability assessment 
tools for the water systems those have developed since last decade. 
 Section 3 establishes a methodology for vulnerability assessment of the water 
supply system when fire occurs in the system. This section explains why it is important 
to identify the most critical pipes in the system during fire event and what techniques can 
be applied to locate those critical components. A methodology based on dynamic 
programming optimization procedure is developed to identify the most critical 
components of the water supply system of Micropolis, a virtual city model, during fire 
flow condition. The objective function of the optimization model is formulated to 
maximize damage caused by fire when one or more pipes has destroyed or disrupted. 
Based on available flow and pressure at the fire location, damage is evaluated and the 
pipes whose removal from the system caused the maximized damage are identified as 
the critical pipes for fire at that particular location. 
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 Section 4 presents the results from the optimization model for fire at six selected 
locations in the Micropolis water supply system. Based on the results, three mitigation 
strategies are proposed in this section. With these mitigation strategies, more simulations 
are performed with fire at those selected locations and the results of mitigated and 
unmitigated conditions are compared. A benefit cost analysis is also performed to 
evaluate the economically optimum mitigation strategy for each of those selected 
locations. 
 Section 5 summarizes the research findings and recommends a new direction for 
further studies to make water systems even more secure in future. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Water Infrastructure and Its Vulnerability 
 
Water infrastructure is a collection of several independent systems such as the 
water supply system, waste water system, and urban drainage system, each of which 
serves within a specific municipality or region (Haimes et al. 1998). In general, water 
infrastructure include surface and groundwater sources of untreated water, dams and 
reservoirs, raw water transmission networks, treatment facilities, tanks and reservoirs for 
storing treated water, water distribution networks, and waste water collection and 
treatment facilities (Copeland and Cody 2003). The water supply system can be further 
divided into sub-systems like raw water pumping and transmission systems, raw water 
storage and treatment systems, and water distribution systems (Mays and Tung 1991). 
Each of these systems is a collection of some specific components and sub-components; 
for example, the major components of a water supply system are pumping stations, 
elevated storage tanks, reservoirs, and a distribution network. Many types of entities own 
more than 75,000 dams and reservoirs, thousands of miles of water distribution and 
sewer lines, thousands of drinking water and wastewater facilities throughout the 
country. Although hundreds of dams and diversion structures are owned and operated by 
the U.S. federal government, the majority of the water infrastructure is owned and 
managed by public and private entities (Copeland and Cody 2003).  
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In 1996 President Clinton established the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) which identified the eight nation’s critical 
infrastructures like telecommunications, electrical power systems, water supply systems, 
gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, emergency 
services, and continuity of government (Haimes 2005). The purpose of the PCCIP was to 
develop a national strategy to protect the critical infrastructures from potential attacks 
and to assure their continued operation. Later, the White House document of National 
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (White 
House 2003) cited eleven critical infrastructures: agriculture and food, water, public 
health, emergency services, defense industrial base, information and 
telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and 
hazardous materials, and postal and shipping.  This document identified four sectors of 
water systems’ vulnerability including physical, chemical/biological, cyber and 
interruption by another infrastructure’s failure. Thus, the vulnerability of water supply 
infrastructure had been recognized, studied, and documented long before September 11, 
2001. The reason for this attention towards the water supply infrastructure was that these 
systems must provide adequate supply of water with adequate pressure and required 
water quality to communities.  Any physical damage to the system would interrupt the 
flow and pressure through the system, and introduction of any chemicals or 
microorganisms to the system would affect the water quality. 
Haimes et al. (1998) recognized the potential threats against water supply 
systems and proposed a methodology to reduce the vulnerability of the system. The 
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threats towards the water supply system were categorized as physical threats, 
chemical/biological threats, and cyber threats. The physical threats corresponded to the 
destruction of the physical components and control structures of the system caused by 
either natural disaster such as major floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. or by terrorist 
attacks. Chemical/biological threats referred to the injection or addition of toxins, 
chemicals, radioactive materials or biological agents to significantly contaminate the 
supplied water and thereby to endanger the health of the community. Cyber threats 
corresponded to introduction of software viruses through computer networks to disrupt 
or disable Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Generally 
speaking, SCADA systems are the monitoring and control systems in the utility 
industries which help in operating the water system components with proper timing and 
sequence, measuring water quality parameters, etc., without physically accessing the 
network. Thus, SCADA systems can reduce operating cost for a water utility and thereby 
increase a water system’s efficiency. The proposed hardening methodology of the water 
supply system was based on the philosophy of Hierarchical Holographic Modeling 
(HHM) (Haimes 1981). Using the HHM philosophy, the water supply system was 
decomposed into fifteen categories representing the physical, temporal, organizational, 
managerial, institutional, hydrological, water quality, and other aspects of the system. 
The decision was then made to harden the system against natural disaster or terrorist 
attack in terms of security, redundancy, robustness and resilience. The security included 
surveillance, fences, and guards protecting the pumping stations, storage facilities, 
dams/reservoirs, treatment facilities, etc. Redundancy referred to the duplication and/or 
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multiple means of emergency response for system components. Robustness 
corresponded to the increased insensitivity of the system to the model inputs of the 
system. Resilience referred to the state of the system when the system could be operated 
close to its optimum design criteria. Later Haimes (2002) proposed a strategic plan 
combined with the hardening of the water supply system by applying a well planned 
maintenance program and by standardizing the components of water supply and 
distribution systems. The author also stated that training, education, and technology 
transfer are essential to the hardening of any infrastructure. Although hardening of the 
water supply system could result in less vulnerability of the system, absolute hardening 
is unachievable. 
Ezell et al. (2000a) developed the probabilistic Infrastructure Risk Analysis 
Model (IRAM) and applied this to a small water supply and treatment system (Ezell et 
al. 2000b). The IRAM consisted of four phases: (i) identifying the risk to the 
infrastructure, (ii) modeling the risks, (iii) assessing the infrastructure, and, (iv) 
managing the risk to the infrastructure. The Hierarchical Holographic Modeling (HHM) 
(Haimes 1981) philosophy was adopted to decompose the system with respect to 
vulnerability, state, function, and hierarchical structure and the threats to the 
infrastructure were identified. A risk model was then developed to describe the 
consequences and to estimate the probability of mitigating events’ success and failure. 
Using the Partitioned Multi objective Risk Method (PMRM) (Asbeck and Haimes 1984) 
the system’s performance was assessed under potential threats. Finally, the risk 
management was performed by multi-objective tradeoff analysis. Later Ezell et al. 
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(2000b) demonstrated the applicability of IRAM by applying the model to an actual 
municipal water distribution system. This approach could also be used in other complex, 
interconnected infrastructures like electric power and transmission, telecommunications, 
etc. 
Matalas (2005) viewed the probabilistic approach of assessing vulnerability of 
the water supply systems in a different way. The author stated that the probabilistic 
measures could be adopted when the future could be predicted. For instance, natural 
hazards like floods, droughts, storms and earthquakes can be predicted from the past 
hydrology, recurrence intervals, severity of consequences, etc.; but terrorist attacks are 
“unique episodes,” and it could be questionable to apply strictly probability-based 
approaches in such cases. However, the author did not recommend any definite approach 
to such problems as terrorist acts.   
 
2.2. Security Concerns in Response to September 11, 2001 
 
 In June 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 
107-288) which required that all community water systems within the U.S. serving more 
than 3,300 people needed to complete vulnerability assessments and prepare emergency 
response plans.  In November 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 
107-297) and created the Department of Homeland Security to secure the nation’s 
critical infrastructures including the water infrastructure without interfering with the 
responsibilities of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or U.S. Bureau of 
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Reclamation (USBR) in protecting their respective dams and with the responsibilities of 
USEPA in assisting the water and wastewater utilities (Copeland and Cody 2003). 
 As a lead agency in assisting water infrastructure security, USEPA granted 
funding to develop several security tools for vulnerability assessment including: Risk 
Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities (RAM-W), Vulnerability Self Assessment 
Tool, and Security Self Assessment Guide for Small Systems Serving between 3,300 and 
10,000 (Mays 2004). In developing those tools, the American Water Works Association 
Research Foundation (AWWARF), Sandia National Laboratories, Association of 
Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA), National Rural Water Association (NRWA) 
and Association of State Drinking Water Administrators (ASDWA) worked with the 
assistance of USEPA. USEPA also developed a water utility response, recovery and 
remediation guidance for man-made and/or technological emergencies (Mays 2004). 
 Ostfeld and Salomons (2004) presented a methodology to detect accidental or 
deliberate intrusions of harmful chemicals and microorganisms to the water distribution 
system. This method consisted of finding the optimum locations of a set of monitoring 
stations, called an early warning detection system (EWDS), throughout the distribution 
network to reliably identify a contamination event in the system. Assuming that the 
contaminants could be injected through the water distribution system nodes such as 
sources, tanks, and consumers, a randomized pollution matrix (RPM) was constructed to 
provide a stochastic representation of the consequences of a set of randomized 
contaminant intrusion events applied at the nodes. Selecting a number of candidate 
monitoring stations, a genetic algorithm (GA) was applied on the RPM for searching a 
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set of monitoring stations which could detect all or most of the pollution events. On the 
basis of this search result, the optimal locations of the monitoring stations were selected. 
Because the water distribution systems are vulnerable to potential chemical and 
biological threats, this real-time pollutants monitoring system could be applied in 
conjunction with network modeling to detect and to keep track of hazardous 
contaminants throughout a water distribution system. 
 Kumar et al. (1997) and Al-Zahrani and Moied (2001) performed similar 
approaches to identify optimal location of water quality monitoring stations in water 
distribution networks. In the former study, the optimal locations were identified using 
Integer Programming; in the later one a Genetic Algorithm was adopted. Bahadur et al. 
(2003) proposed a methodology to monitor introduced contaminants in water 
distribution systems using extended period simulation model and GIS data. 
 Tidwell et al. (2005) proposed an alternative approach of threat assessment of 
water supply systems using Markov Latent Effect (MLE) modeling. “A latent effect is 
an occurrence, condition, or behavior that does not necessarily cause an immediate 
problem but that can subsequently combine with other occurrences, conditions, or 
behaviors” (Tidwell et al. 2005). In this method, a complex threat system was 
decomposed into sub-systems or decision elements to track down a particular threat from 
its origin to the point of consequence. Each of these decision elements subjected to 
inputs and produced an output; these inputs were the latent effects and external effects. 
To reflect the strength of the relationship between the decision element and the external 
effect, each of the external effects were assigned an attribute value mapped onto a scale 
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of 0 to 1 representing very weak to very strong relations respectively. All decision 
elements were then aggregated and an assessment score was obtained which provided a 
measure of the credibility of a threat. The authors applied the proposed methodology to a 
real municipal water distribution system under two different modes of attack: bomb and 
injection of a toxin and evaluated the level of security of the system under both of those 
threats. 
 Lewis (2006) developed a comprehensive method to analyze infrastructure 
vulnerability in different sectors called Model Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA) 
and thereby suggested a method of allocating limited resources to improve the 
infrastructure security and to reduce the risks. Applying the “Network Theory” Lewis 
(2006) modeled different critical infrastructures such as, water system, power, 
telecommunication, internet, etc., as mathematical graphs containing nodes and links 
where nodes are connected by links. The network was then tested to see if it was a 
“scale-free” network or not. Unlike random graphs which follow a Poisson distribution 
of links, the scale-free networks are generally nonrandom in structure and they follow a 
power law distribution of links. The scale-free network testing involved counting the 
“degree” of nodes, which is the number of links connected to each node, and plotting the 
node frequencies as a histogram. If the shape of the resulting histogram followed a 
power law then the network would be a scale-free network. From the resulting 
histogram, the nodes with maximum degree would be identified as the critical nodes. 
The critical nodes were then modeled as a fault tree, which is a tree structured graph of 
critical nodes. Each critical node was represented as a component and the root of the tree 
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was represented as the sector, for example, a water supply system can be considered as a 
sector and a reservoir with highest degree can be considered as a critical component. The 
fault tree model was then analyzed using an event tree, which is a binary tree that 
represents all possible combinations of failure events generated by the fault tree. The 
sector vulnerability was then calculated from the estimate of component vulnerability, 
which is the probability of a successful attack on the component. Risk at each critical 
node was then computed as the component vulnerability multiplied by the estimated 
damage caused by the component failure. The overall sector risk was also computed and 
the cost of hardening the critical components was estimated as well. Lewis (2006) also 
proposed four strategies to allocate the limited available resources for hardening the 
critical nodes and thereby reducing the vulnerability, these are: (1) manual risk 
reduction, (2) ranked order risk reduction, (3) optimal risk reduction, and, (4) 
apportioned risk reduction. 
 Newman (2003) also studied the behavior and characteristics of complex 
networked systems like the Internet, the World Wide Web, social networks, and 
biological networks and discussed the degree distribution of complex networks. Because 
“degree” of a node represents the number of edges connected to that node, removal of 
nodes from a network will result in loss of connectivity between the nodes and this 
makes higher degree nodes more vulnerable to deliberate attack/removal. Newman 
(2003) discussed various stochastic approaches to understand the function and workings 
of those network systems; however, most of his studies were on information networks 
and social and biological networks. 
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 A significant number of studies on water infrastructure security have been done 
in last two decades; with a few exceptions, most of those security studies have evaluated 
chemical or biological threats even though these systems are vulnerable to physical 
threats as well. Few water supply systems rely on computer-based operation; thus, the 
vulnerability of these systems to cyber threats is relatively less than to other threats 
(Haimes et al. 1998). Various components of urban water supply system offer the 
greatest opportunities for terrorism because of the relative accessibility of these 
components: pumps, tanks, pipelines, valves, meters, etc. (Mays 2004). Any physical 
destruction of these components may result in simultaneous main breaks, loss of water 
pressure and flow through the network which would result in hindering fire fighting 
capabilities. In this study an effort has been made to assess the vulnerability of a city’s 
water supply system during fire flow condition when one or more of the system’s 
physical components are destroyed or disrupted. 
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3. OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Rationale 
 
 The urban water supply system is indispensable to any city’s daily activity 
because the system not only ensures safe drinking water to the end users but also 
provides adequate water to meet domestic, commercial, and industrial needs. To ensure 
safe delivery to the water users, the water supply system is generally designed to fulfill 
the base demand with additional capacity for emergency demand conditions such as 
broken pipes/valves, fire demand, pump and power outages, etc. (Mays 2004). These 
types of emergency loading conditions might arise because of mechanical failure of the 
system during a natural disaster or due to terrorist attacks. In such conditions the system 
might not deliver water to the end users with sufficient flow and pressure. An example 
of an engineering design standard is that of the cities of Bryan and College Station, 
Texas, where under normal conditions, a static pressure of 35 psi (pounds per square 
inch) is maintained throughout the system to meet Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality (TCEQ) requirements (Cities of Bryan and College Station [BCS] 2005); but 
when a segment of a system is damaged it might not maintain the required pressure at 
certain locations. Moreover, when there is a fire in the system, the demand at the fire 
location increases instantly and the system needs to deliver a specified volume of water 
under a required minimum pressure at this fire location. For instance, according to BCS 
(2005), during a fire event a flow of 1,000 gpm (gallons per minute) is required for 
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single family residential areas and a flow of 2,500 gpm is required for commercial or 
multi-family residential areas; while these flow rates are provided, a minimum of 20 psi 
pressure has to be maintained at fire hydrants for fire fighting. This minimum pressure 
requirement is to overcome the head losses between fire hydrants and fire-engine pumps 
(Mays 2004). If either or both the flow and pressure requirements are not fulfilled, the 
fire demand is not satisfied. 
 To ensure reliable delivery of water for fire fighting, water mains are generally 
laid in a grid pattern so that if a single section fails, the damaged section can be isolated 
and the remainder of the system would still provide adequate flows and pressures at 
different fire hydrants near the fire location. But if multiple segments fail, the water 
supply system might not provide the security required by the community. In this study, a 
methodology based on solving a dynamic programming problem has been adapted in 
order to find out which components of a vulnerable water supply system are most critical 
during a fire flow condition. Following the vulnerability analysis, recommendations are 
made for specific mitigation measures such as hardening system pipes and other 
components, adding new network pipes, increasing security around pump stations and 
elevated storage tanks, etc.  
 
3.2. Model Formulation 
 
 A water supply system can be viewed as a collection of links connected to nodes 
(Rossman 2000). Typically the major physical components of a water supply system are 
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pipes, pumps, control valves, junctions, tanks, reservoirs, etc. Pipes are those 
components in the system that convey water from one location to another, and they can 
be of different length and diameter. Based on whether a particular pipe is directly 
connected to a user or not, the pipes can be classified as water mains or service lines. In 
general, pipes with larger diameter conveying water from the sources such as reservoirs, 
tanks, etc. to different locations of a city are called water mains. Pipes with relatively 
smaller diameter carrying water from the mains toward the end users are called the 
service lines, however, a service line can have larger diameter than that of a water main. 
In a similar manner, a junction node can be named differently depending upon its 
location in the network: terminal node, intermediate node, fire hydrant, etc. The terminal 
nodes are laid at the end points of the service lines representing the end users of the 
network and the intermediate nodes are laid along the water mains where the service 
lines, pumps and valves are joined with the mains. The fire hydrants are also laid at the 
end points and are used in connection with a fire-engine pump and a fire hose only 
during occurrence of fire. Because of the functional interdependency of different 
physical components of the water supply system, the performance of the whole system 
depends upon the performance of each component. When a single component of a 
system is destroyed or disrupted, it causes some damage to the entire system; the 
severity of damage would depend upon the type of the component destroyed, location 
and purpose of that component in the system, and also the number of customers who are 
served by that system component. For example, if a service line fails, only the customers 
who use that particular segment of the network would be affected; but if the pump 
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station or a tank is destroyed, the entire system can fail, and this might affect the whole 
community. Because different components of a water supply system cause different 
levels of damages when destroyed, destruction of specific components can be 
conceptualized as a form of decision making. Sometimes water mains are more 
accessible than pump stations or tanks since the mains are laid along the highways, 
bridges, etc.  Simultaneous destruction of multiple mains might cause the same level of 
damages as caused by destruction of a pump station or a tank. Thus, destruction of 
multiple numbers of mains/components can be viewed as interrelated decisions or 
multistage decisions. 
 There are two general approaches to solve this type of problems: conventional 
procedures and optimization procedures (Mays and Tung 1991). Conventional 
procedures are typically based upon simulation models. Even though conventional 
methods are more flexible in representing the characteristics of an actual system, the 
solution process is generally iterative which requires rigorous trial and error. On the 
other hand, optimization procedures eliminate the trial and error process and provide the 
best solution based upon the objective function and the constraints (Mays and Tung 
1991). 
 An optimization problem can be categorized as linear or non-linear, deterministic 
or probabilistic, static or dynamic, discrete or continuous, depending upon the type of 
the objective function and the constraint equations (Mays and Tung 1991). In this study, 
the dynamic programming optimization technique is adapted primarily because of two 
reasons: (1) identifying the most critical components of a water supply system is a 
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multistage decision problem, which dynamic programming can handle effectively; and 
(2) hydraulics of pipe network consists of non-linear equations which could not be 
solved using readily available linear programming packages. Unlike linear programming 
and some non-linear programming, commercial software packages of dynamic 
programming are not generally available; so a dynamic programming code has 
developed using Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0. The hydraulic simulation software EPANet 
2.0 (Rossman 2000) has coupled with Visual Basic using EPANet Programmer’s Toolkit 
(Rossman 1999) to compute flow and pressure at different locations of the network. 
 
3.2.1. Objective Function 
   
 The objective of the vulnerability assessment optimization model is to maximize 
the damage adjacent to a single fire hydrant node caused by destruction or disruption of 
system components such as pipes, pumps, tanks, etc., during occurrence of fire. 
Mathematically, the objective function can be expressed as: 
  
Maximize Z = J (pipe hydraulics; u1, u2, ……, uN)    (3.1)  
 
where, Z = Total damage to the system; 
J = Damage function calculated on the basis of pressure and flow at 
the fire node when one or more of the system components are destroyed 
or disrupted; 
 21
“pipe hydraulics” = Physical laws that govern flow and pressure in pipe 
networks; 
ui = Decision variable at any stage i, where i = 1, 2, 3, ….., N; and 
N = Total number of stages in the problem. 
 
Because of the minimum requirements of both pressure and flow to suppress a 
fire (BCS 2005), the fire flow condition was analyzed twice and the damage function J 
was formulated in two alternative ways described below. 
 
3.2.1.1. Pressure Based Damage Function 
 
When fire occurs at a particular location, the demand at that node increases due 
to withdrawals by fire engines to suppress the fire. To determine the available pressure at 
fire node during a fire event, the demand at fire node is assumed to be equal to the base 
demand or average demand by the consumer plus the fire demand, which is assumed 
here to be 1,000 gpm for a single family residential area, or 2,500 gpm for a multifamily 
or commercial area (BCS 2005). With this added demand, a single period hydraulic 
simulation is performed using EPANet (Rossman 2000) and the resulting pressure at the 
fire node is noted and compared to the required minimum pressure for fire fighting 
which is 20 psi. The pressure based damage function J is then calculated as follows: 
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α [(Preq – Pfire-node) / Preq] + β [Loperable / Rmax]  for Pfire-node < Preq 
J = 0        for Pfire-node = Preq  
γ [(Preq – Pfire-node) / Preq]    for Pfire-node > Preq  
 
where, Preq = minimum required pressure for fire fighting (e.g., 20 psi); 
Pfire-node= available pressure at fire node from hydraulic simulation (psi); 
Loperable =distance to the nearest operable hydrant (i.e., hydrant at which the fire 
flow can be withdrawn at pressure greater than or equal to Preq) (ft); 
 Rmax = allowable radius from the fire node to the nearby hydrants (ft); and 
α, β, γ = weighting coefficients with α + β = γ = 1. 
 
At the fire node the demand is always positive but the available pressure (Pfire-
node) can be positive, zero, or even negative. The negative pressure situation can be 
explained as follows: in water distribution systems, water flows from areas of higher 
energy to areas of lower energy. This “energy” consists of three terms: potential energy, 
pressure energy and kinetic energy, expressed in units of length representing vertical 
height of water column. While moving from higher energy to lower energy, some energy 
is used up by water which is called the head loss. When head loss between two points A 
and B, for example, becomes too high then water cannot actually flow from point A to 
point B. In such a situation, the hydraulic model EPANet (Rossman 2000) gives a 
negative pressure at point B. Because pressures below 0 psi incur high probabilities of 
cavitation, which would be damaging to fire engine pumps, during calculating pressure 
(3.2) 
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based damage function (equation 3.2) any values of Pfire-node less than 0 would be 
unacceptable and thus in such a case and also in the case when Pfire-node equals to 0, the 
pressure term [(Preq – Pfire-node) / Preq] reduces to 1. When the available pressure at fire 
node is  Preq or 20 psi then the pressure term [(Preq – Pfire-node) / Preq] in equation 3.2 
reduces to 0 and when the available pressure at fire node is more than Preq or 20 psi then 
the pressure term [(Preq – Pfire-node) / Preq] becomes negative. The distance term [Loperable / 
Rmax ] is added to the pressure based damage function (equation 3.2) only when the 
available pressure at the fire node is less than the required pressure, which is 20 psi. The 
fire hydrants are generally located 1000 ft apart along the distribution network. During a 
fire event, if the hydrant at fire location can not deliver water at required pressure then 
water is obtained from the nearest operable hydrant. A hydrant will be operable if the 
pressure at that hydrant is at least 20 psi in case of fire at that location. The length of the 
fire hose carried by a fire engine is generally about 1000 ft, and if at least two fire trucks 
are available during a fire condition then water can be obtained collectively from a 
radius of 2000 ft around the fire location. Thus Rmax is here 2000 ft assuming at least two 
fire trucks are available during a fire event at any location. The value of Loperable will 
vary from greater than zero to 2000 ft and thus the distance term will always be less than 
or equal to 1. When the available pressure at fire location is greater than or equal to Preq 
or 20 psi then there is no need to get water from the nearby hydrants and thus the 
distance term is not added to the pressure term in such conditions (equation 3.2). Both 
the pressure term [(Preq – Pfire-node) / Preq] and the distance term [Loperable / Rmax ] in the 
pressure based damage function equation are dimensionless, and the relative influence of 
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these two terms is specified through the coefficients α, β and γ. The values of the 
coefficients α and β are assigned in such a way that α plus β will always equal to 1. 
When the available pressure at the fire node is sufficient to suppress the fire, there is no 
need to get additional supply from nearby hydrants; thus, the pressure based damage 
function (equation 3.2) is independent of the distance term [Loperable / Rmax ] and the value 
of γ will always equal 1. Therefore, values of the pressure based damage function will 
vary from negative values (indicating more than sufficient pressure at needed fire flow) 
to 1 (indicating complete failure of the water distribution system to supply water for fire 
fighting). 
 
3.2.1.2. Flow Based Damage Function 
 
A formulation of the damage function that compares available flow rate to 
needed flow rate is also possible.  In this formulation, pressure at the hydrant node is 
fixed at its minimum and available flow is determined using the hydraulic model; this 
contrasts with the above section where flow was fixed and available pressure was 
determined.  In the hydraulic model, the flow through a fire hydrant can be modeled at 
fixed pressure by specifying the node to be an “emitter” (Rossman 2000). An emitter is a 
device that discharges water to the atmosphere through an open orifice.  Flow through an 
emitter is proportional to the square root of pressure available at that node: q = Cp0.5, 
where q = flow through the emitter in gpm; p = available pressure in psi; and C = 
discharge coefficient for emitter in gpm/psi0.5 (Rossman 2000). To determine the 
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maximum flow available at a fire hydrant, the available pressure is assumed to be 20 psi 
and a discharge coefficient for that emitter is determined according to the hydrant’s 
physical characteristics. For a 10-inch diameter connection fire hydrant C = 1850 
gpm/psi0.5, and for a 3-inch diameter connection C = 166.5 gpm/psi0.5. Then a single 
period hydraulic simulation is performed, and the free orifice flow at the hydrant (noted 
as the emitter’s “actual demand” in the simulation result) is determined. The maximum 
available flow at the fire node would be the “actual demand” minus “base demand” 
(Rossman 2000); that is, if normal consumer demands were also associated with a node, 
they would be subtracted to find the flow available exclusively for fire fighting. The 
flow based damage function J is thus calculated as follows: 
 
 α [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq] + β [Loperable / Rmax] for Qmax-available < Qreq 
J = 0       for Qmax-available = Qreq            
γ [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq]    for Qmax-available > Qreq  
 
where, Qreq  = required flow for fire fighting according to regional fire code (gpm); 
 Qmax-available = maximum available flow at fire node from hydraulic simulation  
   = [“Actual demand” – “Base demand”] (gpm); 
 Loperable =distance to the nearest operable hydrant (ft); 
 Rmax = allowable radius from the fire node to the nearby hydrants (ft); and 
 α, β, γ = weighting coefficients with α + β = γ = 1. 
 
(3.3)
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When the available flow at a fire node is less than the required flow (Qreq) for fire 
fighting the flow term [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq] in equation (3.3) becomes less than 1. 
When the available flow is equal to Qreq then the flow term [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq] 
becomes 0, and when the available flow at fire node is greater than Qreq then the flow 
term [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq] becomes negative. The distance term [Loperable / Rmax] is 
added to the flow based damage function (equation 3.3) when the available flow at the 
fire node is less than the required flow. In such a case water is generally obtained from 
the nearest operable hydrants to suppress the fire. For the cases when the available flow 
at fire location is greater than or equal to the required flow for fire fighting there is no 
need to get water from nearby hydrants and thus the distance term [Loperable / Rmax] is not 
added with the flow term [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq]. Like the pressure based damage 
function (equation 3.2), the flow based damage function (equation 3.3) is dimensionless, 
and the relative significance of flow term [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq] versus the distance 
term [Loperable / Rmax] is determined by the coefficients α, β, and γ. The values of the 
coefficients α and β are assigned so that α plus β will equal to 1. The value of γ would 
always be equal to 1 since this coefficient is used in calculating the flow based damage 
function only when the available flow at a fire node is more that the required, which 
means there is no need to get additional water from nearby hydrants during fire 
condition. Because Loperable varies between 0 and Rmax , the distance term [Loperable / Rmax] 
will always be less than or equal to 1. Thus the value of the flow based damage function 
(equation 3.3) will vary from some negative values to some values less than or equal to 
1.  
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3.2.2. Decision Variables 
  
 The dynamic program decision variables are the elements of the system which 
are to be destroyed or disrupted. It is obvious that destroying the pumping station or the 
elevated storage tank would not only cause the maximum damage to the system but 
would also be a matter of straightforward computation of damage using EPANet 
(Rossman 2000). On the other hand, destruction or disruption of multiple pipes to cause 
maximized damage is a matter of multistage decisions. In this study, only the water 
mains are considered to be destroyed or disrupted and thus the water mains are the 
model decision variables and are represented as the u’s in equation 3.1. The subscripts 
with the decision variable u represent the indexes for stages. 
 In dynamic programming problems, stages are the points of the problem where 
decisions are to be made. In this study, decisions are to be made whether or not each 
water main/component is to be destroyed. Thus every water main of the system 
corresponds to a stage and the total number of water mains will correspond to the total 
number of stages in this problem. Again, only one decision has to be made at each stage: 
whether or not the particular water main is destroyed or disrupted. If a water main is 
destroyed at any current stage then the decision variable would be 1 for that stage, if not, 
then the decision variable would be 0. Thus, 
 
   1 if component is destroyed or disrupted 
 uk = 
0 if component is not destroyed or disrupted 
 
(3.4) 
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Where, uk = decision variable at any current stage k. 
 
3.2.3. System State and Constraints 
 
 In dynamic programming, the “state” or the current condition of the system is 
expressed by the system state variables Xk. These variables describe the current state of 
the system at any stage k. These state variables can link the successive stages of a 
dynamic programming problem in such a way that each stage is optimized separately 
and the resulting decision remains feasible for the entire problem (Mays 1996). The 
function that expresses the relationships between the input state, the output state and the 
decision at each stage is called the “state transition function”. 
The system constraints include the limits to the state variable Xk. In this model 
the maximum allowable failures, meaning, the maximum number of water 
main/component to be destroyed, will be set as Xmax. Thus, at any stage the state variable 
will always be less than or equal to Xmax. Furthermore, the decision at a current stage k 
would depend upon the decision that has made in the previous stage k-1. For example, if 
a certain pipe has destroyed at any stage, then it is impossible to destroy it again in a 
later stage. The model state transition function and the constraints can be expressed as: 
 
 Xk = Xk-1 + uk  State Transition Function   (3.5) 
 X0 = 0   Initialization constraint   (3.6) 
 XN ≤ Xmax  Terminal constraint    (3.7) 
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where, Xk = state variable at any current stage k; 
 Xk-1 = state variable at any previous stage k-1; 
  uk = decision variable at any current stage k; 
X0 = state variable at “zero-th” stage; 
 XN = state variable at final stage; 
 Xmax = maximum allowable failures (or, elements to be destroyed); and 
 N = total number of stages in the problem. 
 
3.3. Model Development and Application 
 
 After September 11, 2001, because of security concerns, water utilities 
throughout the U.S. have restricted access to detailed information on most urban water 
supply systems. In response to this concern for security of real systems’ data, 
Brumbelow et al. (2005) developed a virtual city water supply system named 
“Micropolis” to support further studies on urban water supply systems security. 
Micropolis is a detailed model of a virtual small town, with a population of 5,000. Its 
water infrastructure model consists of one surface reservoir, one aquifer, one elevated 
tank, 8 pumps, 1088 pipes, 1262 junction nodes, 52 fire hydrants and 196 valves. Among 
those 1088 pipes there are 574 water mains which will be considered to be the stages in 
the optimization model because the destruction or disruption of those water mains would 
be more critical than destruction of service lines. 
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 Using the dynamic programming formulation described above, an optimization 
model was developed using Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 and the Micropolis water supply 
system. In order to calculate the objective function (equation 3.1), EPANet (Rossman 
2000) hydraulic simulation model is coupled with the optimization model using EPANet 
Programmer’s Toolkit (Rossman 1999). The flow chart for the algorithm of the 
optimization model is presented in Fig. 3.1 and the program code for the model has 
presented in APPENDIX-C. The inputs and outputs of the optimization model are as 
follows: 
Model Inputs: (1) the network file of the water supply system, 
  (2) the EPANet report file and the output file name, 
  (3) maximum allowable failures, 
  (4) location of fire, 
  (5) required pressure for fire fighting, 
  (6) required flow for fire fighting, 
  (7) allowable radius to be considered for nearby hydrants, and 
(8) damage function type (pressure based or flow based) to be used for 
the particular computation. 
Model Outputs: (1) optimal decisions (u*), these are the components/water mains of the 
network which if destroyed or disrupted would cause the maximum damage to the 
system under a fire flow condition, 
 (2) optimum damage function value (J*), and 
 (3) operable nodes for that particular fire location. 
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Start
Get Input Data  
 For k = 1 to N
Max feasible state = minimum (k, xmax) 
For xk = 0 to Max feasible state 
For xk-1 = xk – 1 to xk 
Check for previous stages’ decisions 
and update the network accordingly 
xk - xk-1 = 0 xk - xk-1 = 1 
False
True
Run EPANet for 
updated network with uk 
0
Run EPANet for 
updated network with uk 
1
True 
Calculate damage 
function J0 for uk = 0 
Calculate damage 
function J1 for uk = 1 
Find maximum damage 
function J and update J* 
Find optimal decision u* 
based upon J* 
End
Fig. 3.1. Flow chart of the dynamic programming optimization procedure 
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 The city of Micropolis has 52 fire hydrant locations and thus the fire flow 
analysis can be performed on each of those 52 hydrants. Because the hydrants are 
located at a distance of 500 ft to 1000 ft apart along the water mains, most of the 
hydrants in a close proximity along the same water main may respond to fire demands 
and system damage in a similar manner. In order to eliminate the repetition of results 
and also to reduce the time needed for analysis, six vulnerable fire locations throughout 
the city were selected for intensive analysis.  
For each fire hydrant the input data of the network file, required pressure for fire 
fighting and allowable radius for nearby hydrants are set constant; the required flow for 
fire fighting is either 1000 gpm or 2500 gpm depending upon the location of the fire 
hydrant (BCS 2005). Using the maximum allowable failures Xmax equal to 1, 2, 3, etc., 
the simulation was performed using both the pressure based and flow based damaged 
function (equation 3.2 and 3.3).  
As stated previously, all the 574 water mains have been considered as the stages 
for the dynamic programming optimization model. Thus for each value of the allowable 
state the model steps through 574 stages and at each stage the model calculates the 
damage function (equation 3.2 and 3.3) using the EPANet hydraulic simulation model 
(Rossman 2000). During this process the optimization model has to call the EPANet 
Toolkit functions (Rossman 1999) residing in a dynamic link library (DLL) software file 
repeatedly, and a situation eventually arose where the DLL failed to execute because of 
insufficient memory in the machine used for simulations. Accommodating this issue of 
memory constraints to allow full inclusion of all 574 stages was deemed outside the 
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scope of this study.  Instead, the number of dynamic programming stages was reduced to 
overcome the problem. Because of the presence of intermediate nodes along the water 
mains, a single water main is often divided into different segments and enumerated as 
several mains in the hydraulic model. To reduce the number of stages in the optimization 
model, 55 representative water main segments were chosen from the 574 water mains to 
be the stages used in the dynamic programming solution. The 55 water mains selected 
were chosen as relatively large diameter pipes that collectively described the system 
topology and connectivity.  That is, the 55 selected mains represent the most important 
ones in terms of probable flow and importance of connections to multiple system nodes. 
The 55 selected water mains used as dynamic programming stages are listed in Table 
3.1.  
The model is applied in an iterative fashion.  For each of the six critical fire 
hydrant locations, the maximum allowable failures (Xmax) is set to 1. Now using the 
dynamic programming optimization model’s pressure based damage function, the single 
most critical water main of the system (i.e., the one whose removal from the system 
results in maximum damage) is identified. Then the maximum allowable failures (Xmax ) 
is set to 2 and using the model the 2 most critical system components are identified.  
This process continues to increasing numbers of attacks/failures of mains. 
It is expected that, as the number of maximum allowable failures (Xmax ) will 
increase, the damage (equation 3.1) will also increase; however the damage will not 
increase indefinitely. By increasing the number of maximum allowable failures (Xmax ) a 
state will be reached when any incremental increase in number of component failure will 
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not contribute to any incremental increase in damage; this condition is referred to as a 
“plateau.”  For each of the six selected fire locations, the maximum allowable failures 
(Xmax ) is increased from 1 to until the pressure based damage reaches a plateau. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. List of Water Mains Used as Stages in the Model 
 
Main ID 
 
 
Length 
(ft) 
 
 
Diameter 
(in) 
 
 
Main ID 
 
 
Length 
(ft) 
 
 
Diameter 
(in) 
 
MA478 179.56 12  MA766 145.00 12 
MA495 217.04 12  MA772 110.56 12 
MA505 127.24 8  MA788 108.96 12 
MA549 189.16 2  MA793 134.80 12 
MA552 201.96 12  MA802 201.96 12 
MA565 104.96 12  MA811 222.76 12 
MA576 195.76 12  MA814 167.72 12 
MA591 224.80 4  MA817 174.44 12 
MA599 208.56 4  MA819 163.44 12 
MA609 265.60 12  MA821 6.00 12 
MA610 337.64 4  MA823 299.76 12 
MA638 175.80 12  MA864 228.44 6 
MA647 200.12 8  MA883 164.00 6 
MA654 155.44 8  MA895 237.12 6 
MA662 136.56 8  MA906 206.20 6 
MA672 403.68 8  MA925 209.76 6 
MA676 388.96 8  MA963 361.56 12 
MA678 405.88 8  MA964 366.6 8 
MA679 373.20 8  MA965 234.80 4 
MA691 369.80 4  MA989 263.12 12 
MA693 155.84 4  MA991 355.04 12 
MA728 343.44 4  MA997 273.92 12 
MA735 192.20 4  MA1006 160.76 12 
MA737 398.36 4  MA1013 361.80 6 
MA740 353.12 4  MA1019 390.36 6 
MA745 99.16 12  MA1020 363.56 6 
MA749 105.48 12  MA1024 370.96 6 
MA758 153.20 12     
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As mentioned earlier, when the available pressure at the fire node is less than the 
required then water is obtained from nearest operable hydrants. But if a situation arises 
where none of the nearby hydrants remains operable, then there is no other way to obtain 
water for suppressing the fire and the system will fail. The computation will be stopped 
in such a condition. The same procedure is repeated for all six fire locations using the 
flow based damage function. 
 The number of failures versus damages and corresponding optimal decisions 
with list of operable nodes for both the pressure based and flow based damage functions 
at all six critical fire locations have been tabulated in APPENDIX-A. During the 
simulation, the chosen values of the coefficients α and β are 0.99 and 0.01 respectively. 
The coefficient α corresponds to the weight of the pressure term (equation 3.2) and flow 
term (equation 3.3) in the damage function equations when the pressure and/or flow at 
the fire hydrant is less than the required according to the regional fire code. The 
coefficient β corresponds to the weight of the distance term in pressure based and flow 
based damage function when water to be obtained from a nearby hydrant in the event of 
less available pressure and flow at the fire hydrant. As the hydrant at a fire location will 
more significantly contribute water with required pressure and flow than that from a 
nearby hydrant, the value of the weighting coefficient α is kept significantly higher than 
the value of the coefficient β. The selection of the values of the coefficients α and β is a 
choice made by the analyst. To demonstrate the effect of the coefficients α and β in 
damage function equation, a sensitivity analysis has also performed using different 
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values of the coefficients α and β, and the resulting failure versus damage curves for 
different values of α and β have been presented in APPENDIX-B. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 This section applies the vulnerability assessment methodology described in 
Section 3 to the water system of Micropolis. First the methodology is applied to some 
selected locations of the water system to assess the system’s vulnerability during fire 
flow conditions. The results from the optimization model are then interpreted in terms of 
the system’s “robustness” and “resilience” and are summarized using the terms “Green 
Light,” “Yellow Light,” and “Red Light” conditions to describe the state of the system 
during a fire event. 
 Analyzing the results, three mitigation strategies are proposed to reduce the 
vulnerability caused by destroying or disrupting the critical pipes during occurrence of 
fire. Later in this section, the proposed mitigation strategies are applied in the same 
selected locations of the Micropolis water system and the results from both the 
unmitigated and the mitigated conditions are analyzed and compared to describe the 
effectiveness of the proposed methodology. 
 Finally, a benefit-cost analysis is performed at each selected location to evaluate 
the most economically optimum mitigation strategy for the system under fire flow 
condition. During the analysis, fixed values of the weighting coefficients α and β 
referring to the damage function equations (equations 3.2 and 3.3) are used. To 
demonstrate the model’s sensitivity toward the weight of the pressure and flow terms 
 38
(equations 3.2 and 3.3) compared to the distance term, different values of the 
coefficients α and β are used under unmitigated condition and the results from this 
analysis are described at the last part of this section.     
 
4.2 Results of the Vulnerability Analysis 
 
 Using the methodology described in the previous section, vulnerability analysis 
was performed for six fire hydrant locations: HY17, HY29, HY40, HY53, HY61, and 
HY66. Among those six hydrants, HY17, HY29, and HY61 are located in single family 
residential areas; HY40 serves a commercial area; HY53 is located in a multifamily 
residential area; and HY66 serves both a single family residential area and a commercial/ 
industrial area of the city of Micropolis. Fig. 4.1 shows the building map of Micropolis 
along with the locations of the hydrants and the service areas covered by each of those 
six hydrants. The service areas are circles around each of the six hydrants of radius 1000 
feet; it is assumed that a fire inside a service area might lead to the hydrant being tapped 
for fire suppression.  During the simulation, a fire flow of 1000 gpm is used at hydrant 
locations HY17, HY29, and HY61 (located in single family residential areas); a fire flow 
of 2500 gpm is used at locations HY40, HY53, and HY66 (located in multifamily 
residential and industrial/commercial areas); and a required pressure of 20 psi is used for 
all hydrants for analyzing the fire flow. In addition, a lesser fire flow of 1000 gpm is 
used at locations HY40, HY53 and HY66 to study the effects of fire flow magnitudes. 
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For all six fire locations, both the pressure based (equation 3.2) and flow based (equation 
3.3) damage functions have been used to evaluate the maximized damage. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Building map of Micropolis with water distribution network shown with 
blue lines and hydrants included in the vulnerability analysis indicated with yellow 
markers 
 
 
 
 As discussed in Section 3 both the pressure based and flow based damage 
functions will vary from some negative value to 1. When using the pressure based 
damage function, a constant fire flow of 1000 gpm (single family residential area) or 
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2500 gpm (multi-family/commercial area) is used as an input in addition to the base 
demand and the available pressure is evaluated and compared to the required pressure at 
the respective fire location. Similarly, when the flow based damage function is used, the 
available pressure of 20 psi is used as an input and the resulting available flow is 
computed and compared with the required fire flow according to the regional code. Thus 
in the ideal situation it is expected that both the pressure based and the flow based 
damage function will contribute to similar type of response to the system. But if a 
situation arises when multiple number of mains break causes substantial reduction of 
pressure or flow in the system, then the pressure based and flow based damage functions 
might not represent the similar level of damages. 
 
4.2.1. Robustness, Resilience, and “Green-Yellow-Red Light” Conditions 
 
 A system’s functionality and behavior under failures and attacks are often 
expressed by the terms “robustness” and “resilience”. “Robustness” is a system’s 
capacity to sustain some amount of damage and still provide its intended level of service. 
Thus, robustness in case of a water distribution system providing fire fighting flows 
would be its capacity for damage that does not prohibit it from providing fire flows at 
adequate flow and pressure. A system operating in this mode is here referred to as being 
in a “Green Light” condition. 
“Resilience”, on the other hand, is the system’s ability to sustain the impact of 
damage and recover and resume its operations to continue to provide some minimum of 
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services. In case of a water distribution system providing fire flows, resilience would be 
its ability to operate at diminished capacity providing lesser flow and pressure than 
desired. A system operating in this mode is here referred to as being in a “Yellow Light” 
condition. In such a case, the resulting economic losses generally remain within 
manageable limits (Haimes 1998).  
If a situation arises when damage becomes so great that the damage overcomes 
the both the system’s robustness and resilience and the system becomes unable to 
provide any flow and pressure, then this situation will correspond to a complete failure 
of the system. A system in this mode is referred to as being in a “Red Light” condition. 
A “Red Light” situation is indicated in the hydraulic model when it can not be solved or 
when none of the nearby hydrants remains operational.   
In this methodology, the damage functions (equation 3.2 and 3.3) were 
formulated in such a way that the values for both the pressure based and flow based 
damage will vary from some negative value up to 1. When the damage function is less 
than or equal to 0, it indicates that the system is performing adequately and this situation 
will be referred to as a “Green Light” condition. For any values of damage functions 
greater than 0 but less than 1, the system will be in a state of “Yellow Light” condition. 
When the damage function reaches the maximum value 1, then the system is in failure 
mode and such a situation will be referred to as a “Red Light” condition. 
For each fire condition, the maximum allowable number of failures (Xmax) of the 
system is varied from 1 to until the damage reaches a plateau and/or damage becomes so 
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great that the hydraulic model can not be solved and the results from the model are 
summarized below using the “Green Light”/ “Yellow Light”/ “Red Light” concept.  
 
4.2.2. Hydrant HY17 
 
 Fig. 4.2 represents number of failures versus damages at hydrant HY17 using the 
pressure based and flow based damage functions. Since both damage function 
formulations are dimensionless with a maximum value of 1, they can be plotted on the 
same scale to compare the similarity or dissimilarity between them.  
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Fig. 4.2. Number of failures versus damage function at hydrant HY17 with fire 
flow=1000 gpm 
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The figure indicates that with a maximum allowable failures (Xmax) equals 1, both 
the pressure based and flow based damage functions become greater than 0, thus, the 
system is not robust for fire at hydrant HY17. The figure also indicates that the pressure 
based and flow based damage functions reach plateaus after removal of 2 mains and 3 
mains, respectively. However, at the plateaus, both the damage function values are less 
than 1. Thus the system demonstrates its “Resilience” / “Yellow Light” condition when 
fire occurs at hydrant HY17. The presence of resilience for more than 3 failures is solely 
due to the system’s ability to draw water from other nearby hydrants. 
 
4.2.3. Hydrant HY29 
 
Fig. 4.3 represents number of failures versus damages when fire occurs at 
hydrant HY29. In this case, the pressure based damage function shows different result 
than that of flow based damage function. The constant values of pressure based damage 
function indicate that for any number of maximum allowable failures (Xmax), the pressure 
at this hydrant is either 0 or negative and water is obtained from a nearest operable 
hydrant to suppress the fire. Because pressure at this hydrant is less than or equal to 0, so 
the pressure term [(Preq – Pfire-node) / Preq] in equation 3.2 is always 1. This pressure term 
along with the constant distance term [Loperable / Rmax ] contribute to the constant damage 
function equal to 0.997 for any number of component failures. However, the hydraulic 
model can not be solved using pressure based damage function (equation 3.2) when the 
maximum allowable failures (Xmax) is greater than 16. Although the damage function is 
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less than 1, the system corresponding to pressure based damage function demonstrates a 
“Red Light” condition because the hydraulic model could not be solved further. 
 
 
 
Failure vs. Damage at HY29 with Fire Flow=1000 gpm
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Number of Failure
D
am
ag
e 
Fu
nc
tio
n
Pressure Based Damage Function Flow based Damage Function
 
Fig. 4.3. Number of failures versus damage function at hydrant HY29 with fire 
flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
  When the flow based damage function is used at hydrant HY29, none of the 
nearby hydrants remains operable for maximum allowable failures (Xmax) more than 4. 
Thus, the system is non operational and this situation indicates a “Red Light” condition 
with fire at hydrant HY29 when maximum allowable failures (Xmax) is greater than 4. 
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4.2.4. Hydrant HY40 
 
 The fire flow analysis at hydrant HY40 was performed using both 1000 gpm and 
2500 gpm fire flows. The number of failures versus damages at hydrant HY40 with fire 
flow equal to 1000 gpm is presented in Fig. 4.4a. The figure indicates that the pressure 
based damage function remains constant for any number of maximum allowable failures 
(Xmax). This constant damage situation at HY40 with 1000 gpm fire flow is because of 
the fact that the available pressure at this location during fire is always less than or equal 
to 0. Thus, the pressure term in damage function equation (equation 3.2) remains 1 and  
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Fig. 4.4a. Number of failures versus damage function at hydrant HY40 with fire 
flow=1000 gpm 
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with the contribution from the distance term due to a nearest operable hydrant HY64, the  
resulting maximized pressure based damage at this location remains constant. However, 
the hydraulic model can not be solved when maximum allowable failures (Xmax) become 
greater than 11. The flow based damage function, on the other hand, increases with 
increase in number of maximum allowable failures (Xmax) up to Xmax equals 5. After that 
none of the nearby hydrants remains operable and the system fails. Thus, both the 
pressure based and flow based damage functions with fire flow equal to 1000 gpm 
demonstrate  a “Red Light” condition when fire occurs at hydrant HY40. 
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Fig. 4.4b. Number of failures versus damage function at hydrant HY40 with fire 
flow=2500 gpm 
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Fig. 4.4b shows the number of failures versus damages at hydrant HY40 with 
2500 gpm fire flow. In this case, for a maximum allowable failures (Xmax) of 1, the 
pressure based damage function reaches a value close to 1; after that the optimization  
model can not remove any more pipes irrespective to any number of maximum 
allowable failures (Xmax). This non responding behavior of the optimization model is 
because of the fact that, with failure of the single most critical pipe MA478, the pressure 
based damage function (equation 3.2) reaches the maximum value and the removal of 
any more pipes is not making the damage function larger. The flow based damage 
function, however, never reaches the plateau because after maximum allowable failures 
(Xmax) equal to 5, none of the nearby hydrants remains operational and the hydraulic 
simulation is stopped. Thus, results from both the pressure based and flow based damage 
functions demonstrate a “Red Light” condition at hydrant HY40 with 2500 gpm fire 
flow.  
 
4.2.5. Hydrant HY53 
 
The fire flow analyses at hydrant HY53 were performed using both 1000 gpm 
and 2500 gpm flows, and the results are shown in Figs. 4.5a and 4.5b, respectively. Fig. 
4.5a indicates that the pressure based damage function remains constant at a value 0.993 
until maximum allowable failures (Xmax) equals 3. Then the damage function increases 
slightly from 0.993 to 0.998 with an additional failure of one more pipe. The damage 
function remains constant at that value until maximum allowable failures (Xmax) equals 8. 
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With Xmax greater than 8 the pressure based damage function reduces to a value 0.993 
and remains constant afterwards. This phenomenon can be explained as follows: the 
available pressure at HY53 during fire is always less than or equal to 0, and thus the 
pressure term [(Preq – Pfire-node) / Preq] in damage function equation (equation 3.2) remains 
1 for any number of component failures or Xmax. For Xmax less than or equal to 3, the 
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Fig. 4.5a. Number of failures versus damage function at hydrant HY53 with fire 
flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
nearest operable hydrant to HY53 is HY64, which is 600 ft away (nearest operable 
hydrants are listed in Appendix A in Table A.1.5). For all the values of Xmax between 4 
and 8 HY64 remains no longer operable and the nearest operable hydrant to HY53 is 
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now HY51 which is more than 600 ft away. Thus the distance term in pressure based 
damage function (equation 3.2) increases for Xmax between 4 and 8 and the 
corresponding damage function also increases. For Xmax greater than 8, HY64 becomes 
operable again as different set of optimal decisions appear in such condition and the 
damage function value reduces to 0.993 again and remains constant afterwards. Because 
of this unusual nature of the pressure based damage function at HY53, the result can not 
be interpreted as “Green/Yellow/Red Light” condition. The flow based damage function 
with 1000 gpm fire flow reaches the plateau when maximum allowable failures (Xmax) 
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Fig. 4.5b. Number of failures versus damage function at hydrant HY53 with fire 
flow=2500 gpm 
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equals to 2. As the flow based damage function value is less than 1 at the plateau, the 
system demonstrates its “Resilience” / “Yellow Light” condition. The presence of 
resilience after Xmax equals to 2 proves the system’s ability to draw water from nearby 
operable hydrants. 
 
 Fig. 4.5b shows that with 2500 gpm fire flow, the pressure based damage 
function at hydrant HY53 remains constant at 0.993 for any number of maximum 
allowable failures (Xmax). This constant damage function value is due to occurrence of 
negative or zero pressure at the fire hydrant. The flow based damage function, on the 
other hand, increases with increase in maximum allowable failures (Xmax) and reaches a 
plateau at Xmax equals to 2. Because both the damage functions reach a value less than 1 
at the plateau, the system demonstrates its “Resilience” / “Yellow Light” condition. 
 
4.2.6. Hydrant HY66 
 
Fig. 4.6a and Fig. 4.6b represent number of failures versus damages at hydrant 
HY66 with 1000 gpm and 2500 gpm fire flows respectively. With 1000 gpm fire flow 
(Fig. 4.6a), both the pressure based and flow based damage functions reach the plateaus 
at Xmax equals to 5 and Xmax equals to 4 respectively. At the plateaus, both the damage 
functions achieve a value 0.998, thus, the system demonstrates its “Yellow Light” 
condition. 
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Failure vs. Damage at HY66 with Fire Flow=1000 gpm
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Fig. 4.6a. Number of failures versus damage function at hydrant HY66 with fire 
flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.6b shows that with a higher fire flow ( e.g., 2500 gpm) the pressure based 
damage function becomes constant for any number of allowable failures (Xmax). 
However, the flow based damage function increases with increase in number of failure 
and the damage reaches a plateau at Xmax equals to 4. Because at the plateaus, both the 
damage functions reach a value less than 1, the system demonstrates its “Resilience” / 
“Yellow Light” condition. In this case, the system draws water from its nearby operable 
hydrants.   
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Failure vs. Damage at HY66 with Fire Flow=2500 gpm
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Fig. 4.6b. Number of failures versus damage function at hydrant HY66 with fire 
flow=2500 gpm 
 
 
 
4.2.7. Hydrant HY61 
 
 When the methodology discussed in this section is applied at hydrant HY61 with 
maximum allowable failures (Xmax) equals to 1, none of the nearby hydrants remains 
operable and both the pressure and flow based damage functions became infinitely large. 
This situation obviously demonstrates a “Red Light” condition. Because of the infinite 
damage, the number of failures versus damages can not be plotted and shown for hydrant 
HY61.  
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4.3. Analysis and Recommendation of Mitigation Strategies 
  
 Mitigation is the process by which vulnerabilities of a system are reduced. In the 
present research, the vulnerability of a water supply system was analyzed with respect to 
the system’s ability to provide adequate flow and pressure for fire responses during 
failure or attack on the system. Thus mitigation, in this case, will be the process by 
which the threat toward the water system will be reduced and the system’s performance 
will be improved. These objectives can be achieved by hardening the water supply 
system’s critical components. In the previous sections, the critical water mains of the 
system for fire at six selected locations are identified. By knowing those critical 
components, couple of strategy will be developed in this section to secure those critical 
components and thereby, to increase the system’s ability of providing adequate water 
with required flow and pressure for fire fighting. 
In the vulnerability analysis presented above, it was found that some elements of 
the Micropolis water distribution system were repeatedly among the most critical 
components for fire flows at different hydrants.  (The decision elements for all scenarios 
are given in Appendix A). On the basis of the results, three mitigation strategies were 
considered that included hardening a specific set of pipes, and further simulations were 
performed on the hardened water supply system to assess its changed vulnerability under 
each mitigation strategy. The general idea of hardening a water supply system is to make 
the system less vulnerable to physical threats than it is at present. There are different 
approaches to hardening of the system including: shielding the pipes, burying the pipes 
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deeper into the ground, replacing the existing pipes with better materials, installing 
surveillance cameras near the critical water mains, and providing redundancy in the 
distribution network, among others. Because most of the pipes/water mains in the city of 
Micropolis are decades old and are made of less durable pipe materials like cast iron and 
asbestos cement, hardening of the critical water mains could be accomplished by 
replacing those pipes with more durable ductile iron pipes. Ductile iron pipes are 
generally stronger and less brittle than the cast iron pipes. The tensile strength and 
ductility of ductile iron is increased by adding small quantities of magnesium in the 
molten iron (Twort et. al., 1994). Because of the increased durability and flexibility of 
ductile iron pipes, they are gradually replacing most cast iron pipes in distribution 
networks (Mays, 1996).  In the mitigation scenario simulations, “hardened” pipes were 
assumed to be incapable of failure and removed from the possible set of damaged pipes 
for system optimization.    
During simulation of the model for different mitigation strategies only the flow 
based damage function (equation 3.3) was used to evaluate damage at the previously 
stated locations. The pressure based damage function (equation 3.2) was not used during 
further evaluation of damage because of the common occurrence of negative pressure at 
fire locations, which caused the pressure term of the pressure based damage function to 
become unity. Because the contribution from the pressure term is more significant than 
that from the distance term, the damage function value becomes constant for any number 
of component failures during occurrence of negative pressure. Thus the attempt to use 
pressure based damage function was not very useful and only the flow based damage 
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function is used for further calculations.  This rationale can be observed in Figs. 4.2 to 
4.6b where plateaus for the pressure based function began at low numbers of failures.  
The flow based functions, in contrast, convey more refined information across a larger 
possible number of failures. 
As was done in the vulnerability analysis, the mitigation strategies were analyzed 
with fire flow requirements based on the urban areas where the selected hydrants are 
located, in accordance with typical local codes. For instance, hydrants HY17, HY29, and 
HY61 were analyzed with 1000 gpm fire flow because those hydrants are located in 
single family residential areas, and hydrants HY40, HY53, and HY66 were analyzed 
with both 1000 gpm and 2500 gpm fire flows as they are located in multi-family and 
commercial areas. The location of the above mentioned six hydrants along with the base 
demand at all the junction nodes have shown in Fig. 4.7. 
 
The assessed mitigation strategies include: 
 
• Mitigation Strategy-I: This strategy includes hardening of pipe MA1006. 
The pipe MA1006 is a 12 inch diameter main that connects the main 
pumping station with the distribution network. This pipe showed up as 
the single most critical component of the network for all six fire locations. 
Thus, hardening this particular pipe was considered as the first mitigation 
strategy. 
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Fig. 4.7. Network map of Micropolis with nodal base demands, hydrants used for 
vulnerability and mitigation analysis, and mains hardened in various mitigation 
scenarios 
 
 
 
• Mitigation Strategy-II: This strategy recommends hardening of pipes 
MA549, MA552, MA591, and MA1006. Pipe MA591 is another 
significant pipe of the network that conveys water from the city’s water 
tower to the eastern part of the network. This pipe along with pipes 
MA549 and MA552 showed up as critical components for most of the 
previously mentioned hydrants when simulation was performed with 
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Mitigation Strategy-I. Thus hardening of pipe MA549, MA552 and 
MA591 along with the pipe MA1006 can be considered as a better 
mitigation option for this system. 
 
• Mitigation Strategy-III: This strategy recommends hardening of pipes 
MA549, MA552, MA591, MA691, MA693, MA728, and MA1006. The 
pipes MA691, MA693, and MA728 provide connectivity between 
MA1006 and the rest of the network. Thus, even after hardening the main 
MA1006 if the three pipes mentioned above being removed, the pump 
station will be isolated from the rest of the network. Moreover, the pipes 
MA691, MA693, and MA728 showed up as critical components during 
simulations with Mitigation Strategy-II. On the basis of the results from 
Strategy-II, Strategy-III was defined to be hardening of MA691, MA693, 
and MA728 along with the pipes recommended in Strategy-II. 
 
The list of optimal decisions for Xmax = 3 (i.e., a maximum of 3 non-hardened 
components could be removed from the system) from simulation of both the unmitigated 
and all three mitigation strategies at all six hydrant locations are tabulated in Table 4.1, 
and the results of failure versus damage with three alternative mitigation strategies for all 
six hydrants are presented in the following sections from Fig. 4.8 to Fig. 4.13. 
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Table 4.1. Optimal Decisions on Critical Network Components for Xmax = 3 
Optimal Decisions for Xmax = 3 Fire 
Hydrant Unmitigated Mitigation 
Strategy-I 
Mitigation 
Strategy-II 
Mitigation 
Strategy-III 
HY17 MA802, MA989, 
MA1006 
MA591, MA691, 
MA693 
MA802, MA989, 
MA1024 
MA802, MA989, 
MA1024 
HY29 MA1006, MA1020, 
MA1024  
MA549, MA638, 
MA814 
MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA478, MA638, 
MA814 
HY40 MA478, MA1006, 
MA1024 
MA478, MA549, 
MA552 
MA478, MA691, 
MA693 
MA478, MA672, 
MA678 
HY53 MA693, MA883, 
MA1006 
MA591, MA691, 
MA693 
MA693, MA883, 
MA965 
MA883, MA991, 
MA997 
HY61 MA1006 (system 
failed after Xmax=1) 
MA591, MA691, 
MA693 
MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA737, MA740, 
MA1024 
HY66 MA1006, 1019, 
MA1024 
MA576, MA591, 
MA691 
MA576, MA691, 
MA693 
MA576, MA802, 
MA883 
 
 
 
4.3.1. Analysis of Mitigation Strategies at Hydrant HY17 
 
Fig. 4.8 represents the flow based damage function at hydrant HY17 for both 
unmitigated and all three mitigated conditions. From the figure it can be concluded that 
all three mitigation strategies have the same effect on this hydrant and the damage 
function value caused by the removal of one pipe in the unmitigated situation can be 
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reduced by more than 50% with applying either one of the mitigation strategies. None of 
the mitigation strategies has any significant effect in reducing the damage at HY17 when 
the number of component failures (Xmax) is more than one. 
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Fig. 4.8. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY17 with fire flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
4.3.2. Analysis of Mitigation Strategies at Hydrant HY29 
 
Fig. 4.9 shows number of failures versus damages for the different mitigation 
strategies, and Table 4.2 shows the list of optimal decisions for a maximum number of 
failures (Xmax) of 4 during fire at hydrant HY29. With unmitigated condition the system 
demonstrated its “Red Light” condition when maximum allowable failures (Xmax) was 
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greater than 4. Strategy-I reduces the damages, and the system retains significant 
resiliency until the maximum number of failures (Xmax) reaches 10.  
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Fig. 4.9. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY29 with fire flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
With strategy-II, the system retains greater resiliency up to maximum allowable 
failures (Xmax) equal to 11. But in this case, the damage is higher than that during 
unmitigated condition. Referring to equation 3.3, the damage function is a combination 
of both the flow term [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq] and the distance term [Loperable / Rmax] 
when available flow is less than the required. Because most of the fire flow will be 
obtained from the target fire hydrant rather than from nearby hydrants, the flow term is 
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weighted significantly higher than the distance term. Thus, higher damage with 
Mitigation Strategy-II for Xmax equals to 4 indicates that the available flow at HY29 is 
lower with Strategy-II than that with unmitigated condition when four pipes are 
removed.  
 
 
 
Table 4.2. List of Optimal Decisions for Xmax = 4 with Fire at Hydrant HY29 
Optimal Decisions for Xmax = 4 
Unmitigated Mitigation Strategy-I  Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-
III 
MA549, MA814, 
MA1006, MA1024 
MA549, MA638, 
MA691, MA814 
MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA1024 
MA478, MA638, 
MA814, MA883 
 
 
 
This situation can be explained with reference to Fig. 4.7 and Table 4.2. The base 
demands (i.e., without fire flows) at all nodes in Micropolis are shown in Fig. 4.7. When 
fire occurs at HY29, the demand increases instantly at that location and the system tries 
to meet that increased demand along with the base demands at all other nodes. In the 
unmitigated condition with Xmax equals to 4, pipes MA549, MA814, MA1006, and 
MA1024 caused the maximized damage when flow based damage function was used. 
Referring to Fig. 4.7, there are significant amounts of base demand in the terminal nodes 
TN458, TN459 and TN460 under normal condition. When pipes MA814 and MA1024 
were removed, the area with higher demand was isolated and the system provided 
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adequate flow towards HY29 to meet the emergency loading condition during fire. With 
Mitigation Strategy-II, pipes MA591 and MA1006 are hardened with two other water 
mains and the four most critical components are now pipes MA691, MA693, MA728 
and MA1024. Although MA1006 was hardened, the removal of pipes MA691, MA693 
and MA728 made the pump station isolated and the only source for supplying water is 
the elevated storage tank. Because the pipe MA814 remained in the network, the system 
had to provide some flow toward the high demand area and thus the available flow at 
HY29 becomes less than that of unmitigated condition which in turn resulted in higher 
damage with Strategy-II.  Thus, Strategy-II appears to increase damage because it 
ensures greater flows for normal needs will reach other areas of the distribution system.  
With Strategy-I and III, both the pump station and the storage tank provided 
adequate water to the system and the system could deliver more flow to HY29 after 
meeting the demands at nodes TN458, TN459 and TN460. With Mitigation Strategy-III, 
the system retains significant resiliency up to maximum allowable failures (Xmax) equal 
to 11. After that the hydraulic model can not be solved, thus, the system demonstrates its 
“Red Light” condition when maximum number of failures is greater than 11. 
 
4.3.3. Analysis of Mitigation Strategies at Hydrant HY40 
  
Figs. 4.10a and 4.10b show number of failures versus damages for different 
mitigation strategies during fire at hydrant HY40 with fire flows of 1000 gpm and 2500 
gpm respectively. From both the results it can be noticed that the damage function with 
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Mitigation Strategy-II for Xmax equals to 5 is higher than that with the unmitigated 
condition. This situation can be explained with referring to Fig. 4.7 and Table 4.3. 
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Fig. 4.10a. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY40 with fire flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
During unmitigated condition, removal of pipe MA1006 isolated the pump 
station and also pipes MA549 and MA1024 being critical separated the high demand 
area of the network (Fig. 4.7). Thus the only source in such condition was the elevated 
storage tank which could not provide adequate water to those high demand areas because 
of the longer flow path. But with Mitigation Strategy-II, pipes MA1006, MA549, 
MA552 and MA591 were hardened and in such a condition water from the storage tank 
provided some flow to the terminal nodes TN458, TN459 and TN460 through  
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Mitigation Strategies for HY40 with Fire Flow=2500 gpm
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Fig. 4.10b. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY40 with fire flow=2500 gpm 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. List of Optimal Decisions for Xmax = 5 with Fire at Hydrant HY40 
Optimal Decisions for Xmax = 5 
Unmitigated Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-
III 
MA478, MA549, 
MA552, MA1006, 
MA1024 
MA478, MA549, 
MA552, MA691, 
MA1024 
MA478, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, 
MA989 
MA478, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, 
MA1024 
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comparatively shorter flow path and thus the available flow at hydrant HY40 became 
less than that of unmitigated condition. As a result, the damage is more at HY40 with 
Strategy-II for Xmax equals to 5 than that at unmitigated situation. 
 
With Mitigation Strategy-I, the damage reaches the plateau at Xmax equals to 7 for 
both 1000 gpm and 2500 gpm. However, with 1000 gpm fire flow, the model could not 
remove more than 8 pipes even though the allowable decision of removing pipes was set 
to 9 (Table A.2.3). This is because of the fact that with maximum allowable failures 
(Xmax) equals to 8, the damage function reaches its maximum value and removing any 
more pipes does not make the damage any bigger. Thus the marginal value of the ninth 
pipe is 0 and the model can not remove more than 8 pipes. 
With 2500 gpm fire flow during unmitigated condition the system demonstrated 
its “Red Light” condition for maximum allowable failures (Xmax) more than 5. With 
Mitigation Strategy-I, the system retains significant resiliency up to Xmax equals to 10. 
With Mitigation Strategy-II, the system retains its resiliency up to Xmax equals to 11. 
With Mitigation Strategy-III the system retains greater resiliency up to Xmax equals to 12. 
When more than 12 pipes were removed, the hydraulic model was unsolvable, and it is 
assumed the system reached “Red Light” status. 
 
4.3.4. Analysis of Mitigation Strategies at Hydrant HY53 
 
 Fig. 4.11a and Fig. 4.11b show the number of failures versus damages for 
different mitigation strategies with 1000 gpm and 2500 gpm fire flows respectively at  
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Fig. 4.11a. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY53 with Fire Flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
hydrant HY53. From the results with lower fire flow it can be concluded that with all 
three mitigation strategies, the damage can be reduced by 20% when Xmax equals to 1. 
For any values of Xmax greater than 1, the Strategy-I and II is not significant compared to 
the unmitigated condition. Strategy-III, on the other hand, significantly reduces the 
overall damages in this case and the system retains great resiliency up to Xmax equals to 
10.  
The analyses with higher fire flows show similar results with a relatively higher 
magnitude in damages. The reason is obvious; referring to equation 3.3, for the same 
magnitude of available flow, the flow term [(Qreq – Qmax-available) / Qreq] will be more for 
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higher required flow than that with a lower required flow. Thus the magnitude of 
damage with 2500 gpm fire flow is higher than that with 1000 gpm fire flow. 
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Fig. 4.11b. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY53 with Fire Flow=2500 gpm 
 
 
 
4.3.5. Analysis of Mitigation Strategies at Hydrant HY66 
 
The simulation results from different mitigation strategies for hydrant HY66 are 
shown in Figs. 4.12a and 4.12b. Fig. 4.12a shows the different mitigation strategies with 
1000 gpm fire flow. From the figure it can be seen that all three strategies reduce 
damage significantly. With Strategy-I, the system retains its resiliency up to Xmax equals 
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to 10. However with both Strategy-II and III, the system retains significant resiliency up 
to Xmax equals to15. 
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Fig. 4.12a. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY66 with fire flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
 Fig. 4.12b shows the simulation results for different mitigation strategies when 
2500 gpm fire flow is used. The results are somewhat similar to the results from 1000 
gpm fire flows with higher magnitude in damages. The damages are higher with higher 
fire flow requirements than that with lower fire flow requirements because of the fact 
that, higher the required flow magnitude, greater is the flow term in equation 3.3 and 
thus, the damage is also higher. 
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Fig. 4.12b. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY66 with fire flow=2500 gpm 
 
 
 
4.3.6. Analysis of Mitigation Strategies at Hydrant HY61 
 
The damage at hydrant HY61 was infinitely large for any value of Xmax greater 
than or equals to 1 during unmitigated condition. When mitigation strategies are applied 
with fire at this location the damages reduce significantly, especially with Mitigation 
Strategy-III. Fig. 4.13 shows the simulation results from different mitigation strategies. 
The figure indicates that the system responds in a similar manner with Strategy-I and II 
when fire occurs at HY61. With Strategy-I and II the damage functions reach plateaus 
after removal of 3 mains and 4 mains respectively with a value 0.996. Thus, in both the 
cases, the system demonstrates its “Resilience” / “Yellow Light” condition. However, 
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Strategy-III reduces the damage even more significantly and the system retains its 
resiliency up to Xmax equals to 13.  
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Fig. 4.13. Mitigation strategies for hydrant HY61 with fire flow=1000 gpm 
 
 
 
4.3.7. Benefit Cost Analysis for Proposed Mitigation Strategies 
 
 The proposed mitigation strategies for reducing the damage are based upon the 
optimal decision of destroying/disrupting the water mains with fire at selected locations. 
From the simulation results of the mitigation strategies, it can be noted that all three 
mitigation strategies can reduce the damage moderate to substantially during fire 
condition. But, in any decision making process the selection of alternative strategies also 
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depends upon economic feasibility (Wurbs and James 2002). To demonstrate the 
economic feasibility of the mitigation strategies, a benefit cost analysis was performed 
with fire at hydrants HY17, HY29, HY40, HY53, and HY66. Since all three strategies 
recommend hardening of certain number of pipes, the economic cost of the alternative 
strategies will correspond to the cost of hardening. As mentioned earlier, hardening of 
the critical water mains can be achieved by replacing those pipes with same diameter 
ductile iron pipes. Assuming an excavation and backfill cost of $1.05/ft and the cost of 
ductile iron, cement lined, class 50 water pipe with 12 inch, 8 inch, and 4 inch diameter 
as $29.61/ft, $11.39/ft and $18.56/ft, respectively (Mossman 1997) the estimated cost of 
hardening for all three mitigation strategies are listed in Table 4.4. 
 
 
 
Table 4.4. Estimated Costs of Hardening for Proposed Mitigation Strategies 
Mitigation Strategy Estimated Cost ($) 
I 5,000 
II 17,700 
III 28,500 
 
 
 
The benefits are calculated on the basis of reduction in damages by applying 
different mitigation strategies with fire at the above five locations. Because the property 
values are different at different locations, the costs of rebuilding the assets in the areas 
covered by the hydrants HY17, HY29, HY40, HY53, and HY66 (Fig. 4.1) were  
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Table 4.5. Net Benefit Comparison for Different Mitigation Strategies at Xmax = 3 
Fire Location 
with Required 
Fire Flow (FF) 
Mitigation 
Strategy 
Estimated 
Cost 
$
Estimated 
Benefit 
$
Benefit-Cost 
Ratio 
Net Benefit 
 
$
I 5,000 840 0.17 -4,160
II 17,700 53,370 3.02 35,670
HY17 
FF=1000gpm 
 III 28,500 53,369 1.87 24,869
I 5,000 2,465,053 493.01 2,460,053
II 17,700 1,020,353 57.65 1,002,653
HY29 
FF=1000gpm 
 III 28,500 5,068,082 177.83 5,039,582
I 5,000 1,173,981 234.80 1,168,981
II 17,700 1,135,624 64.16 1,117,924
HY40 
FF=2500gpm 
 III 28,500 1,637,330 57.45 1,608,830
I 5,000 574 0.11 -4,426
II 17,700 0 0.00 -17,700
HY53 
FF=2500gpm 
 III 28,500 5,906,156 207.23 5,877,656
I 5,000 1,949,620 389.92 1,944,620
II 17,700 2,031,771 114.79 2,014,071
HY66 
FF=2500gpm 
 III 28,500 3,089,384 108.40 3,060,884
 
 
 
estimated based on the cost of rebuilding facilities on a per square foot basis (Chiang 
1997). The estimated cost was then multiplied by the damage function for both 
unmitigated and all three mitigated conditions to get the estimated cost of damage at the 
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respective fire locations. The benefit from adapting a certain mitigation strategy is 
equivalent to how much building replacement cost is saved from fire damage in 
implementing the strategy. From the estimated benefit and cost, a benefit-cost ratio and 
net benefits are calculated and presented in Table 4.5. From the table, it can be  
concluded that for a maximum allowable failure (Xmax) of 3, Mitigation Strategy-III  
yields more net benefit than the other two strategies at all hydrant locations except 
HY17. Thus Strategy-III is economically optimum. 
 
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis of Weighting Coefficients α and β 
 
 A sensitivity analysis on the values of the weighting coefficients α and β was 
performed with fire at hydrants HY17, HY29, HY40, HY53 and HY66. During this 
analysis only flow based damage function was used because the pressure based damage 
function was not very effective in previous simulations. The resulting number of failures 
versus damages for all hydrant location with unmitigated condition are presented in Fig. 
B.1 through B.5 in APPENDIX-B. During this analysis three different sets of values for 
α and β were chosen, these are: (i) α=0.99 and β=0.01, (ii) α=0.92 and β=0.08, and (iii) 
α=0.85 and β=0.15. It should be noted that all three sets of values of α were chosen to be 
significantly higher than the values of β. The reason for choosing higher values of α is 
that, this coefficient represents the weight of the flow term in damage function equation 
when the available flow at fire location is less than the required flow for suppressing the 
fire. In this situation, water will be obtained primarily from the hydrant at fire location 
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and the additional flow will be obtained from any nearby operable hydrants. The 
coefficient β, on the other hand, represents the weight of the distance term in equation 
3.3. As the target fire hydrant will contribute most of the flow for fire fighting, the 
values of α will always be higher than that of the coefficient β. And, for any values of α 
and β, the sum of the coefficient α and β will be equal to 1. From the figures it can be 
concluded that for any sets of values of α and β, the shape of the ‘Failure versus 
Damage’ curves remains unchanged at all hydrant locations. However, the magnitude of 
damage changes with the values of α and β. This represents that the model is very 
sensitive to the selection of values for the coefficients α and β. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. Conclusions 
 The study of vulnerability of water supply systems has drawn great attention 
around the world recently. The proposed methodology in this study demonstrates how to 
identify the most critical pipes of any water supply system for a fire event. Obviously the 
pumping stations and elevated storage tanks are the most critical components of the 
system, however, this methodology is focused toward the pipes/links of the system 
because of two reasons: (1) pipes make up the largest capital investment in any water 
utility (Mays, 1996) and (2) the supply mains are relatively unprotected and easily 
accessible. The results from the optimization model illustrate that even though the 
critical components/pipes of a water supply system vary depending upon the location of 
fire, some of the same water mains appeared as the most vulnerable components for fire 
at all six locations under consideration. Based on those critical components/water mains 
of the system, three mitigation strategies were proposed to harden specific sets of water 
mains. In addition to hardening of the specific system components as recommended in 
this study, the following additional mitigation measures could also be applied: 
 
• Installation of surveillance cameras, electrifying fences, guards, etc. around the 
pumping stations, elevated storage tanks, and near critical water mains, 
• Providing standby pumps if one or more pumps in the pumping station get out of 
service, 
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• Installing alternative sources of power supply for pumping operation in case of 
emergency, 
• Providing trained field operators for emergency response, and 
• Maintaining an inventory of locations of the fire department and available fire 
trucks at those locations. 
 
Simulations of the mitigation strategies show that the damage can be reduced 
significantly by adapting the mitigation measures, and the system’s robustness and 
resilience can be improved as well. Because cost is associated with hardening and 
adding security of the system, a benefit cost analysis was also performed for all three 
mitigation strategies assuming a maximum allowable failure equals to 3. Although the 
model shows that all of the three proposed strategies can reduce the damages 
substantially during fire, Strategy-III gives more net benefit and stands out to be 
economically optimum among all three mitigation strategies.  
 In this study the optimization model has been developed in a generalized way so 
that the same model can be used for any water supply system provided that the model 
inputs have been added correctly. Most of the vulnerability assessment tools developed 
so far for the water systems have emphasized on chemical/biological threats. This model 
could provide a new direction for researchers. Occurrence of fire during a terrorist attack 
is obviously a physical threat to water system which in turn might cause a substantial 
damage to the society because of the interdependency of water infrastructure with other 
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critical infrastructures. Thus this optimization model could be used as a potential 
vulnerability assessment tool for urban water supply system in future. 
 
5.2. Recommendations for Future Research 
 
 In assessing the vulnerability of the water supply system during this study, only 
pipes were considered as potential critical components of the system. In reality, the 
junction nodes are also critical elements of the system and are needed to be considered. 
Lewis (2006) developed Model Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA) methodology to 
assess the vulnerability of any critical infrastructure using network theory. In his 
proposed methodology, Lewis (2006) focused on the critical nodes, identified with 
respect to the degree distribution of the nodes, and analyzed the system’s vulnerability 
and risk at those critical components. Because “degree” of a node represented the 
number of links connected to that node, removal of nodes from a network resulted in 
loss of connectivity between the nodes and this made higher degree nodes more 
vulnerable to deliberate attack/removal. The idea of critical node analysis based upon the 
degree of a node can be adapted for future study of water supply systems. Conceptually, 
the hydrants and the terminal nodes are single-degree nodes, where as, the junction 
nodes are multiple-degree nodes. Thus optimization models can be developed for the 
water system to find out the most critical nodes of the system which may cause 
substantial damage to the system. Because of the restrictions in certain format of the 
model input file, the proposed model cannot be used to identify the critical 
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nodes/junctions and the corresponding degree for those nodes of the system; however, 
the proposed model can be modified to perform the above mentioned analysis. To 
achieve this, more understanding of the network structures, man hour and effort is 
required. If this can be done in near future, hopefully it will give us better and efficient 
security strategies to protect the water system.             
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AMSA  Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies 
ASDWA Association of State Drinking Water Administrators 
AWWA American Water Works Association 
BCS  Cities of Bryan and College Station, Texas 
EWDS  Early Warning Detection System 
FF  Fire Flow 
GA  Genetic Algorithm 
GIS  Geographic Information System 
GPM  Gallons per minute 
HHM  Hierarchical Holographic Modeling 
IRAM  Infrastructure Risk Analysis Model 
MBVA Model Based Vulnerability Analysis 
MLE  Markov Latent Effect 
NRWA National Rural Water Association 
PCCIP  President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
PMRM Partitioned Multi-objective Risk Method 
PSI  Pounds per square inch 
RAM-W Risk Assessment Methodology for Water utilities 
RPM  Randomized Pollution Matrix 
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
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TCEQ  Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
US  United States 
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 
USBR  United States Bureau of Reclamation 
USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency 
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APPENDIX A 
RESULTS FROM THE OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
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Table A.1.1. Results at HY17 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA1006 HY64 MA1006 HY64 
2 MA1006, MA1020 HY64 MA802, MA989 HY14, HY24, 
HY28, HY40-
HY45, HY53-
HY55, HY64, 
HY66, HY68, 
HY69 
3 MA802,MA989, MA1006 HY64 MA802, MA989, MA1006 HY64 
4 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963 
HY64 MA802, MA989, MA1006, 
MA1024 
HY64 
5 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA802, MA963 
HY64 MA802, MA989, MA1006, 
MA1019, MA1024 
HY64 
6 MA552, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA963 
HY64 MA802, MA989, MA1006, 
MA1019, MA1020, 
MA1024 
HY64 
7 MA552, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737 
HY64 MA802, MA989, MA1006, 
MA1013, MA1019, 
MA1020, MA1024 
HY64 
8 MA552, MA647, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737 
 
HY64 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737 
HY64 
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Table A.1.1. (Continued) 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
9 MA552, MA647, MA672, 
MA678, MA679, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA1006 
HY64 
10 MA552, MA647, MA672, 
MA678, MA679, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA735, 
MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802, 
MA989 
HY64 
11 MA552, MA647, MA672, 
MA676, MA678, MA679, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA735, MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802, 
MA989, MA1024 
HY64 
12 MA552, MA647, MA672, 
MA676, MA678, MA679, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA735, MA737, MA740 
HY64 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802, 
MA989, MA997, MA1006 
None 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87
Table A.1.2. Results at HY29 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA1006 HY64 MA1006 HY64 
2 MA814, MA1006 HY64 MA1006, MA1024 HY64 
3 MA691,MA693, MA1006 HY64 MA1006, MA1020, 
MA1024 
HY64 
4 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA1006 
HY64 MA549, MA814, 
MA1006, MA1024 
HY64 
5 MA549, MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA1006 
HY64 MA549, MA638, 
MA814, MA1006, 
MA1013 
None 
6 MA549, MA638, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA1006 
HY64   
7 MA549, MA552, MA638, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA1006 
HY64   
8 MA549, MA552, MA638, MA672, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA1006 
HY64   
9 MA549, MA552, MA638, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA1006 
HY64   
10 MA549, MA552, MA638, MA647, 
MA672, MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA1006 
HY64   
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Table A.1.2. (Continued) 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
11 MA549, MA552, MA638, MA647, 
MA672, MA678, MA679, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA1006 
HY64   
12 MA549, MA552, MA638, MA647, 
MA672, MA676, MA678, MA679, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA1006 
HY64   
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Table A.1.3. Results at HY40 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA1006 HY64 MA1006 HY64 
2 MA478, MA505 HY1, HY4, 
HY6, HY11, 
HY12, HY14, 
HY17, HY29, 
HY37, HY38, 
HY42-HY44, 
HY50-HY54, 
HY62, HY64, 
HY65, HY68 
MA478, MA1006 HY64 
3 MA478, MA505, MA549 Same as above MA478, MA1006, 
MA1024 
HY64 
4 MA478, MA505, MA549, 
MA552 
Same as above MA478, MA1006, 
MA1020, MA1024 
HY64 
5 MA478, MA505, MA549, 
MA552, MA565 
Same as above MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA1006, MA1024 
HY64 
6 MA478, MA505, MA549, 
MA552, MA565, MA576 
Same as above MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA1006, 
MA1013 
None 
7 MA478, MA505, MA549, 
MA552, MA565, MA576, 
MA599 
Same as above   
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Table A.1.3. (Continued) 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
8 MA478, MA505, MA549, 
MA552, MA565, MA576, 
MA599, MA609 
Same as above   
9 MA478, MA505, MA549, 
MA552, MA565, MA576, 
MA599, MA609, MA610 
Same as above   
10 MA478, MA505, MA549, 
MA552, MA565, MA576, 
MA599, MA609, MA610, 
MA638 
Same as above   
11 MA478, MA505, MA549, 
MA552, MA565, MA576, 
MA599, MA609, MA610, 
MA638, MA647 
Same as above   
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Table A.1.4. Results at HY40 with 2500 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA478 HY64 MA1006 HY64 
2   MA478, MA1006 HY64 
3   MA478, MA1006, 
MA1024 
HY64 
4   MA478, MA1006, 
MA1020, MA1024 
HY64 
5   MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA1006, MA1024 
HY64 
6   MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA1006, 
MA1013 
None 
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Table A.1.5. Results at HY53 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA1006 HY64 MA1006 HY64 
2 MA883, MA1006 HY64 MA883, MA1006 HY64 
3 MA691, MA693, MA728 HY51, HY52, 
HY64 
MA693, MA883, MA1006 HY64 
4 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA693, MA883, MA1006, 
MA1024 
HY64 
5 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883, MA906 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA883, MA1006 
HY64 
6 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883, MA906, MA925 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA883, MA1006 
HY64 
7 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883, MA906, MA925, 
MA991 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA883, 
MA1006 
HY64 
8 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883, MA906, MA925, 
MA991, MA997 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA883, MA1006 
HY64 
9 MA552, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA735, 
MA737, MA740, MA745 
HY51, HY52, 
HY64 
MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA883, MA1006, MA1013 
HY64 
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Table A.1.5. (Continued) 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
10 MA552, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA735, 
MA737, MA740, MA745, 
MA749 
HY51, HY52, 
HY64 
MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883, MA1006, 
MA1013 
HY64 
11 MA552, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA735, 
MA737, MA740, MA745, 
MA749, MA758 
HY51, HY52, 
HY64 
MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883, MA895, 
MA1006, MA1013 
HY64 
12 MA552, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA735, 
MA737, MA740, MA745, 
MA749, MA758, MA766 
HY51, HY52, 
HY64 
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Table A.1.6. Results at HY53 with 2500 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA1006 HY64 MA1006 HY64 
2 MA883, MA1006 HY64 MA883, MA1006 HY64 
3 MA691, MA693, MA728 HY51, HY52, 
HY64 
MA693, MA883, MA1006 HY64 
4 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA693, MA802, MA883, 
MA1006 
HY64 
5 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883, MA906 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA883, MA1006 
HY64 
6 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883, MA906, MA925 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA883, MA1006 
HY64 
7 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883, MA906, MA925, 
MA991 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA883, 
MA1006 
HY64 
8 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883, MA906, MA925, 
MA991, MA997 
HY14, HY45, 
HY51, HY52, 
HY55 
MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA883, MA1006 
HY64 
9 MA552, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA735, 
MA737, MA740, MA745 
HY51, HY52, 
HY64 
MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA883, MA1006, MA1013 
HY64 
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Table A.1.6. (Continued) 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
10 MA552, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA735, 
MA737, MA740, MA745, 
MA749 
HY51, HY52, 
HY64 
MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883, MA1006, 
MA1013 
HY64 
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Table A.1.7. Results at HY66 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA1006 HY64 MA1006 HY64 
2 MA1006, MA1019 HY64 MA1006, MA1019 HY64 
3 MA1006, MA1019, MA1024 HY64 MA1006, MA1019, MA1024 HY64 
4 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963 
HY64 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA1006 
HY64 
5 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA1006 
HY64 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA1006 
HY64 
6 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA1006, MA1013 
HY64 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA1006, MA1024 
HY64 
7 MA552, MA576, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA1006 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA1006 
HY64 
8 MA552, MA576, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA793, 
MA802, MA1006 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA811, MA1006 
HY64 
9 MA552, MA576, MA610, 
MA672, MA678, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA793, MA802, MA1006 
HY64 
10 MA552, MA576, MA610, 
MA647, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737  
HY64 
 97
Table A.1.7. (Continued) 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
11 MA552, MA576, MA610, 
MA647, MA672, MA678, 
MA679, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737, MA1006 
HY64 
12 MA552, MA576, MA610, 
MA647, MA672, MA678, 
MA679, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA735, MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737, MA802, MA1006 
HY64 
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Table A.1.8. Results at HY66 with 2500 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA1006 HY64 MA1006 HY64 
2 MA1006, MA1019 HY64 MA1006, MA1019 HY64 
3 MA1006, MA1019, MA1024 HY64 MA1006, MA1019, MA1024 HY64 
4 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963 
HY64 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA1006 
HY64 
5 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA1006 
HY64 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA1006 
HY64 
6 MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA1006, MA1013 
HY64 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA1006, MA1024 
HY64 
7 MA552, MA576, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA1006 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA802 
HY64 
8 MA552, MA576, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA793, 
MA802, MA1006 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA802, MA1006 
HY64 
9 MA552, MA576, MA610, 
MA672, MA678, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA793, MA802, MA1006 
HY64 
10 MA552, MA576, MA610, 
MA647, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737 
HY64 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737  
HY64 
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Table A.1.8. (Continued) 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
11   MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737, MA1006 
HY64 
12   MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737, MA802, MA1006 
HY64 
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Table A.1.9. Results at HY61 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Unmitigated Condition 
Pressure Based Damage Flow Based Damage  
Xmax Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
Optimal Decisions Operable 
Nodes 
1 MA1006 None MA1006 None 
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Table A.2.1. Results at HY17 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA802 MA802 MA802 
2 MA802, MA1024 MA802, MA1024 MA802, MA1024 
3 MA591, MA691, MA693 MA802, MA989, MA1024 MA802, MA989, MA1024 
4 MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA989 
MA802, MA989, MA991, 
MA1024 
5 MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989 
MA802, MA989, MA991, 
MA997, MA1024 
6 MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989, MA1019 
MA495, MA793, MA802, 
MA883, MA989, MA1024 
7 MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA1024 
MA495, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA963, 
MA989 
MA495, MA793, MA802, 
MA883, MA965, MA989, 
MA1024 
8 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737 
MA495, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA963, 
MA989, MA1024 
MA495, MA505, MA565, 
MA576, MA609, MA793, 
MA802, MA963 
9 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802 
MA495, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA963, 
MA989, MA1019, MA1024 
MA495, MA505, MA565, 
MA576, MA609, MA793, 
MA802, MA963, MA1024 
10 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802, 
MA1024 
 
MA495, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA963, 
MA989, MA991, MA1019, 
MA1024 
MA495, MA505, MA565, 
MA576, MA609, MA793, 
MA802, MA963, MA989, 
MA1024 
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Table A.2.1. (Continued) 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
11 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802, 
MA989, MA1024 
 MA495, MA505, MA565, 
MA576, MA609, MA793, 
MA802, MA963, MA965, 
MA989, MA1024 
12 MA552, MA591, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802, 
MA989, MA997, MA1024 
 MA495, MA505, MA565, 
MA576, MA609, MA793, 
MA802, MA963, MA965, 
MA989, MA1020, MA1024 
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Table A.2.2. Results at HY29 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA814 MA814 MA814 
2 MA549, MA814 MA691, MA693 MA638, MA814 
3 MA549, MA638, MA814 MA691, MA693, MA728 MA478, MA638, MA814 
4 MA549, MA638, MA691, 
MA814 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA1024 
MA478, MA638, MA814, 
MA883 
5 MA549, MA638, MA691, 
MA693, MA728 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989 
MA478, MA638, MA672, 
MA678, MA814 
6 MA549, MA638, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA1024 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989, MA1019 
MA478, MA638, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA811 
7 MA549, MA638, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA989, 
MA991 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989, MA1019, 
MA1020 
MA478, MA638, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA811, 
MA1024 
8 MA549, MA638, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA814, 
MA989, MA991 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989, MA997, 
MA1013, MA1019 
MA478, MA638, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA811, 
MA989, MA1024 
9 MA549, MA638, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA814, 
MA963, MA989, MA991 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989, MA997, 
MA1013, MA1019, MA1020 
MA478, MA638, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA811, 
MA814, MA989, MA1024 
10 MA549, MA552, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA638, 
MA647, MA672, MA691, 
MA693 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989, MA997, 
MA1013, MA1019, MA1020, 
MA1024 
 
MA478, MA638, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA811, 
MA814, MA963, MA989, 
MA1019 
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Table A.2.2. (Continued) 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
11  MA478, MA638, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA963, MA989, MA1019, 
MA1020, MA1024 
MA478, MA638, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA811, 
MA814, MA963, MA989, 
MA1019, MA1024 
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Table A.2.3. Results at HY40 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA478 MA478 MA478 
2 MA478, MA552 MA478, MA691 MA478, MA814 
3 MA478, MA549, MA552 MA478, MA691, MA693 MA478, MA672, MA678 
4 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737 
5 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA1024 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA989 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA1024 
6 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA989, MA991 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA989, MA1024 
7 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA989 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA989, MA991, 
MA1019 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA989, MA1019, 
MA1024 
8 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA989, MA991 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA964, 
MA965, MA989 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA989, MA1019, 
MA1020, MA1024 
9 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA989, MA991 (Could not 
take out more than 8 pipes) 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA964, 
MA965, MA989, MA1019 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA883, MA895, 
MA963, MA989, MA1013 
10  MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA964, 
MA965, MA989, MA991, 
MA1019 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA883, MA895, 
MA963, MA989, MA1013, 
MA1019 
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Table A.2.3. (Continued) 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
11  MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA964, 
MA965, MA989, MA991, 
MA1019, MA1024 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA883, MA895, 
MA963, MA989, MA1013, 
MA1019, MA1020 
12   MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA883, MA895, 
MA963, MA989, MA1013, 
MA1019, MA1020, MA1024 
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Table A.2.4. Results at HY40 with 2500 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA478 MA478 MA478 
2 MA478, MA552 MA478, MA691 MA478, MA814 
3 MA478, MA549, MA552 MA478, MA691, MA693 MA478, MA672, MA678 
4 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737 
5 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA1024 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA989 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA1024 
6 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA989 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA989, MA1024 
7 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA989 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA989, 
MA1019 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA989, MA1019, 
MA1024 
8 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA989, MA991 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA989, 
MA997, MA1019 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA989, MA1019, 
MA1020, MA1024 
9 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA964, MA989 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA964, 
MA965, MA989, MA1019 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA883, MA895, 
MA963, MA989, MA1013 
10 MA478, MA549, MA552, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA964, MA989, 
MA1019 
MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA964, 
MA965, MA989, MA991, 
MA1019 
 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA883, MA895, 
MA963, MA989, MA1013, 
MA1019 
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Table A.2.4. (Continued) 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
11  MA478, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963, MA964, 
MA965, MA989, MA991, 
MA997, MA1019 
MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA883, MA895, 
MA963, MA989, MA1013, 
MA1019, MA1020 
12   MA478, MA672, MA678, 
MA737, MA883, MA895, 
MA963, MA989, MA1013, 
MA1019, MA1020, MA1024 
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Table A.2.5. Results at HY53 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA883 MA883 MA883 
2 MA693, MA883 MA693, MA883 MA883, MA991 
3 MA591, MA691, MA693 MA693, MA883, MA965 MA883, MA991, MA997 
4 MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA883 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883 (System Unbalanced) 
MA565, MA609, MA610, 
MA883 
5 MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA883 
 MA565, MA609, MA610, 
MA883, MA1013 
6 MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA883 
 MA565, MA609, MA610, 
MA883, MA895, MA1013 
7 MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA883 
 MA565, MA609, MA610, 
MA758, MA883, MA895, 
MA1013 
8 MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883 
 MA565, MA599, MA609, 
MA610, MA758, MA883, 
MA895, MA1013 
9 MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883, MA1013 
 MA565, MA599, MA609, 
MA610, MA758, MA883, 
MA895, MA925, MA1013 
10 MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883, MA895, 
MA1013 
 MA565, MA599, MA609, 
MA610, MA758, MA883, 
MA895, MA925, MA991, 
MA1013 
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Table A.2.6. Results at HY53 with 2500 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA883 MA883 MA883 
2 MA693, MA883 MA693, MA883 MA883, MA991 
3 MA693, MA802, MA883 MA693, MA802, MA883 MA883, MA991, MA997 
4 MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA883 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA883 (System Unbalanced) 
MA565, MA609, MA610, 
MA883 
5 MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA883 
 MA565, MA609, MA610, 
MA883, MA1013 
6 MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA883 
 MA565, MA609, MA610, 
MA883, MA895, MA1013 
7 MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA802, 
MA883 
 MA565, MA609, MA610, 
MA758, MA883, MA895, 
MA1013 
8 MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883 
 MA565, MA599, MA609, 
MA610, MA758, MA883, 
MA895, MA1013 
9 MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883, MA1013 
 MA565, MA599, MA609, 
MA610, MA758, MA883, 
MA895, MA925, MA1013 
10 MA552, MA565, MA591, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA883, MA895, 
MA1013 
 MA565, MA599, MA609, 
MA610, MA758, MA883, 
MA895, MA925, MA991, 
MA1013 
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Table A.2.7. Results at HY66 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA576 MA576 MA576 
2 MA576, MA802 MA576, MA802 MA576, MA802 
3 MA576, MA591, MA691 MA576, MA691, MA693 MA576, MA802, MA883 
4 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA693 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA576, MA793, MA802, 
MA883 
5 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802 
MA576, MA793, MA802, 
MA883, MA964 
6 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA1019 
MA576, MA793, MA802, 
MA883, MA964, MA965 
7 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA811 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA1013, 
MA1019 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883 
8 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA793, MA802 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA793, MA802, 
MA1013, MA1019 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883, MA1019 
9 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA793, MA802 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802 
MA478, MA565, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802 
10 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802, 
MA965 
 
MA478, MA565, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883 
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Table A.2.7. (Continued) 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
11  MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA793, 
MA802, MA814 
MA478, MA565, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883, MA1019 
12  MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA793, 
MA802, MA814, MA819 
MA478, MA565, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883, MA964, MA965 
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Table A.2.8. Results at HY66 with 2500 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA576 MA576 MA576 
2 MA576, MA802 MA576, MA802 MA576, MA802 
3 MA576, MA591, MA691 MA576, MA691, MA693 MA576, MA802, MA883 
4 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA693 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA576, MA793, MA802, 
MA883 
5 MA576, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802 
MA576, MA793, MA802, 
MA883, MA964 
6 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA1019 
MA576, MA793, MA802, 
MA883, MA964, MA965 
7 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA802 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA802, MA1013, 
MA1019 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883 
8 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA793, MA802 
MA576, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA793, MA802, 
MA1013, MA1019 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883, MA1019 
9 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA793, MA802 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802 
MA478, MA565, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802 
10 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802, 
MA965 
 
MA478, MA565, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883 
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Table A.2.8. (Continued) 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
11 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA737, MA802 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA793, 
MA802, MA814 
MA478, MA565, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883, MA1019 
12 MA552, MA576, MA591, 
MA610, MA672, MA678, 
MA679, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA802 
MA576, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA737, MA793, 
MA802, MA814, MA819 
MA478, MA565, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA672, 
MA678, MA737, MA802, 
MA883, MA964, MA965 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115
Table A.2.9. Results at HY61 with 1000 gpm Fire Flow: Mitigated Conditions 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
1 MA691 MA691 MA1024 
2 MA691, MA1024 MA691, MA1024 MA737, MA740 
3 MA591, MA691, MA693 MA691, MA693, MA728 MA737, MA740, MA1024 
4 MA591, MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA989 
MA737, MA740, MA963, 
MA989 
5 MA552, MA591, MA691, 
MA693, MA728 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989 
MA737, MA740, MA963, 
MA989, MA1019 
6 MA552, MA591, MA647, 
MA691, MA693, MA728 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989, MA1019 
MA737, MA740, MA963, 
MA989, MA1013, MA1019 
7 MA552, MA591, MA647, 
MA672, MA691, MA693, 
MA728 
MA691, MA693, MA728, 
MA963, MA989, MA1019, 
MA1020 
MA737, MA740, MA963, 
MA989, MA997, MA1013, 
MA1019 
8 MA552, MA591, MA647, 
MA672, MA679, MA691, 
MA693, MA728 
MA495, MA576, MA609, 
MA610, MA691, MA693, 
MA728, MA963 
MA495, MA576, MA609, 
MA610, MA737, MA740, 
MA883, MA963 
9 MA552, MA591, MA647, 
MA672, MA679, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA740 
MA495, MA505, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA963 
MA495, MA576, MA609, 
MA610, MA737, MA740, 
MA883, MA906, MA963 
10 MA552, MA591, MA647, 
MA672, MA679, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA735, 
MA740 
MA495, MA505, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA963, 
MA1019 
 
MA495, MA505, MA565, 
MA576, MA609, MA638, 
MA647, MA672, MA679, 
MA740 
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Table A.2.9. (Continued) 
Optimal Decisions using Flow Based Damage Function  
Xmax Mitigation Strategy-I Mitigation Strategy-II Mitigation Strategy-III 
11  MA495, MA505, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA963, 
MA1013, MA1019 
MA495, MA505, MA565, 
MA576, MA609, MA638, 
MA647, MA672, MA679, 
MA740, MA963 
12  MA495, MA505, MA576, 
MA609, MA610, MA691, 
MA693, MA728, MA963, 
MA1013, MA1019, MA1020 
MA495, MA505, MA565, 
MA576, MA609, MA638, 
MA647, MA672, MA679, 
MA740, MA793, MA963 
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APPENDIX B 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE WEIGHTING COEFFICIENTS 
α AND β 
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Sensitivity Analysis at HY17 with Fire Flow=1000 gpm
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Fig. B.1. Sensitivity analysis of the coefficients α and β at hydrant HY17 
 
Sensitivity Analysis at HY29 with Fire Flow=1000 gpm
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Fig. B.2. Sensitivity analysis of the coefficients α and β at hydrant HY29 
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Sensitivity Analysis at HY40 with Fire Flow=2500 gpm
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Fig. B.3. Sensitivity analysis of the coefficients α and β at hydrant HY40 
 
Sensitivity Analysis at HY53 with Fire Flow=2500 gpm
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Fig. B.4. Sensitivity analysis of the coefficients α and β at hydrant HY53 
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Sensitivity Analysis at HY66 with Fire Flow=2500 gpm
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Fig. B.5. Sensitivity analysis of the coefficients α and β at hydrant HY66 
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APPENDIX C 
PROGRAM CODE 
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Option Explicit                             'General Declaration 
 
Private Sub cmdClear_Click() 
    'Clear text boxes 
    txtInput.Text = "" 
    txtReport.Text = "" 
    txtOutput.Text = "" 
    txtLnkRmvd.Text = "" 
    txtFireNode.Text = "" 
    txtFireFlow.Text = "" 
    txtPressure.Text = "" 
    txtHYradius.Text = "" 
    lstDisplay.Clear                          'Clear list box 
    chkPressure.Value = vbUnchecked          'Uncheck Pressure 
    chkFlow.Value = vbUnchecked              'Uncheck Flow  
End Sub 
 
Private Sub cmdExit_Click() 
    End 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub cmdRun_Click() 
    Dim InputFile As String, InputFile2 As String, ReportFile As String, OutputFile As String 
    Dim FireNode As String 
    Dim ThisPipe As String 
    Dim links As Integer, pipes As Integer, x_max As Integer, hydrants As Integer, f_flow As Single, 
P_required As Integer, R_max As Integer 
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    Dim dummy1, dummy2, dummy3, dummy4, dummy5, dummy6, dummy7, dummy8, dummy9, 
dummy10, dummy11, dummynode, Header 
    Dim i, m, h, FN As Integer 
    Dim Nnodes As Long 
    Dim Ntanks As Long 
    Dim Njunctions As Long 
    Dim ErrorCode As Long 
    Dim Main() As String * 6 
    Dim Junction_Node() As String * 6 
    Dim Hydrant() As String * 4 
    Dim all_node() As String * 6 
    Dim x_node() As Single 
    Dim y_node() As Single 
    Dim x_coordinate() As Single 
    Dim y_coordinate() As Single 
    Dim Distance() As Single 
     
    'Get input from text boxes 
    InputFile = txtInput.Text 
    ReportFile = txtReport.Text 
    OutputFile = txtOutput.Text 
    x_max = txtLnkRmvd.Text 
    FireNode = txtFireNode.Text 
    f_flow = txtFireFlow.Text 
    P_required = txtPressure.Text 
    R_max = txtHYradius.Text 
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    cmdRun.Enabled = False                   'Disable run button 
    cmdClear.Enabled = False                'Disable clear button 
    Screen.MousePointer = vbHourglass        'Change the mouse pointer to an hourglass shape 
     
    'Retrieving the number of  junction nodes in the network 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopen(InputFile, ReportFile, "") 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetcount(0, Nnodes) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetcount(1, Ntanks) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose() 
    Njunctions = Nnodes - Ntanks 
     
    ReDim Junction_Node(Njunctions) As String * 6 
    ReDim all_node(Nnodes) As String * 6 
    ReDim x_node(Nnodes) 
    ReDim y_node(Nnodes) 
    ReDim Main(55) As String * 6 
     
    'Setting up an array for the mains to be removed 
    Main(1) = "MA478" 
    Main(2) = "MA495" 
    Main(3) = "MA505" 
    Main(4) = "MA549" 
    Main(5) = "MA552" 
    Main(6) = "MA565" 
    Main(7) = "MA576" 
    Main(8) = "MA591" 
    Main(9) = "MA599" 
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    Main(10) = "MA609" 
    Main(11) = "MA610" 
    Main(12) = "MA638" 
    Main(13) = "MA647" 
    Main(14) = "MA654" 
    Main(15) = "MA662" 
    Main(16) = "MA672" 
    Main(17) = "MA676" 
    Main(18) = "MA678" 
    Main(19) = "MA679" 
    Main(20) = "MA691" 
    Main(21) = "MA693" 
    Main(22) = "MA728" 
    Main(23) = "MA735" 
    Main(24) = "MA737" 
    Main(25) = "MA740" 
    Main(26) = "MA745" 
    Main(27) = "MA749" 
    Main(28) = "MA758" 
    Main(29) = "MA766" 
    Main(30) = "MA772" 
    Main(31) = "MA788" 
    Main(32) = "MA793" 
    Main(33) = "MA802" 
    Main(34) = "MA811" 
    Main(35) = "MA814" 
    Main(36) = "MA817" 
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    Main(37) = "MA819" 
    Main(38) = "MA821" 
    Main(39) = "MA823" 
    Main(40) = "MA864" 
    Main(41) = "MA883" 
    Main(42) = "MA895" 
    Main(43) = "MA906" 
    Main(44) = "MA925" 
    Main(45) = "MA963" 
    Main(46) = "MA964" 
    Main(47) = "MA965" 
    Main(48) = "MA989" 
    Main(49) = "MA991" 
    Main(50) = "MA997" 
    Main(51) = "MA1006" 
    Main(52) = "MA1013" 
    Main(53) = "MA1019" 
    Main(54) = "MA1020" 
    Main(55) = "MA1024" 
      
    links = UBound(Main) 
     
    'Setting up a lookup table/array for the Fire Hydrants 
    InputFile2 = "c:\lufthansa\research data\Micropolis Final2a.inp" 
    Open InputFile2 For Input As #2 
    Do 
        Line Input #2, dummy1 
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    Loop Until dummy1 = "[JUNCTIONS]" 
    Line Input #2, Header 
    h = 1 
    For i = 1 To Njunctions 
        Input #2, dummy2, dummy3, dummy4, dummy5, dummy6 
        Junction_Node(i) = dummy2 
        If Left(Junction_Node(i), 2) = "HY" Then 
            ReDim Preserve Hydrant(h) As String * 4 
            Hydrant(h) = Junction_Node(i) 
            h = h + 1 
        End If  
    Next i 
    hydrants = h - 1                        'hydrants corresponds to the total no. of fire hydrants in the network 
    Close #2 
     
    'Releasing the memory allocated by the array Junction_Node() 
    Erase Junction_Node 
        
    'Getting node index for the Fire Node 
    For h = 1 To hydrants 
        If Hydrant(h) = FireNode Then 
            FN = h 
        End If 
    Next h 
     
    ReDim Distance(hydrants) 
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    'Getting the coordinates of each hydrant node from the input file 
    Open InputFile2 For Input As #3 
    Do 
        Line Input #3, dummy1 
    Loop Until dummy1 = "[COORDINATES]" 
    Line Input #3, Header 
    h = 1 
    For i = 1 To Nnodes 
        Input #3, dummynode, dummy2, dummy3 
        all_node(i) = dummynode 
        x_node(i) = dummy2 
        y_node(i) = dummy3 
        If Left(all_node(i), 2) = "HY" Then 
            ReDim Preserve x_coordinate(h) 
            ReDim Preserve y_coordinate(h) 
            x_coordinate(h) = x_node(i) 
            y_coordinate(h) = y_node(i) 
            h = h + 1 
        End If  
    Next i 
    Close #3 
     
    'Releasing the memory allocated by the arrays all_node(), x_node() & y_node() 
    Erase all_node 
    Erase x_node 
    Erase y_node 
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    'Calculating the distance to the hydrant nodes from the fire node 
    For i = 1 To hydrants 
        Distance(i) = ((x_coordinate(FN) - x_coordinate(i)) ^ 2 + (y_coordinate(FN) - y_coordinate(i)) ^ 2) ^ 
0.5 
    Next i 
     
    'Calling dynamic programming sub procedure 
    Call DP_PipeNetwork((FireNode), (ThisPipe), links, x_max, hydrants, f_flow, P_required, FN, R_max, 
InputFile, ReportFile, OutputFile, Main(), Hydrant(), Distance()) 
          
    Screen.MousePointer = vbDefault 
    cmdRun.Enabled = True                   'Enable run button 
    cmdClear.Enabled = True                 'Enable clear button  
End Sub 
 
Private Sub DP_PipeNetwork(ByVal FireNode As String, ByVal ThisPipe As String, links As Integer, 
x_max As Integer, hydrants As Integer, f_flow As Single, P_required As Integer, FN As Integer, R_max 
As Integer, InputFile As String, ReportFile As String, OutputFile As String, Main() As String * 6, 
Hydrant() As String * 4, Distance() As Single) 
    Dim k As Integer                        'index of stages 
    Dim x_k As Integer                      'state variable at current stage 
    Dim x_k_1 As Integer                    'state variable at previous stage 
    Dim u() As Integer                      'decision variable, i,e, the removal of each pipe 
    Dim u_star() As Boolean                 'optimal decision 
    Dim J As Double                         'damage function if no pipe is removed at all 
    Dim J0 As Double                        'damage function if pipe removed from previous stage 
    Dim J1 As Double                        'damage function if pipe removed from current stage 
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    Dim J_star() As Double                  'maximum damage function 
    Dim IncludeThisPipe() As Boolean 
    Dim DamageFunction1 As Double           'damage function calculated while checking pressure 
    Dim DamageFunction2 As Double           'damage function calculated while checking flow 
    Dim L_minimum As Single                 'distance to the node next to Fire Node 
    Dim L_operable As Single                'distance to the next operable node 
    Dim MaxFeasibleState As Integer 
    Dim i As Integer, m As Integer, N As Integer, h As Integer 
    Dim Infeasible As Single 
    Dim temp As String 
    ReDim u(links) 
    ReDim u_star(0 To x_max, 0 To links, 0 To links) 
    ReDim J_star(0 To x_max, 0 To links) 
    ReDim IncludeThisPipe(links) 
     
    'Initializing u_star() 
    For i = 0 To x_max 
        For k = 0 To links 
            For h = 0 To links 
                u_star(i, k, h) = True 
            Next h 
        Next k 
    Next i 
     
    'Initializing J_star() 
    Infeasible = -999999.999999 
    For i = 0 To x_max 
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        J_star(i, 0) = Infeasible 
        For k = 1 To links 
            If i > k Then 
                J_star(i, k) = Infeasible 
            End If 
        Next k 
    Next i 
     
    'Initializing IncludeThisPipe() 
    For k = 1 To links 
        IncludeThisPipe(k) = True 
    Next k 
     
    'Calculating Damage Function without removing any pipe 
    If chkPressure.Value = vbChecked Then 
        Call RunEPANet1((FireNode), (ThisPipe), IncludeThisPipe(), links, hydrants, f_flow, P_required, 
FN, R_max, InputFile, ReportFile, L_minimum, L_operable, DamageFunction1, Main(), Hydrant(), 
Distance()) 
        J = DamageFunction1                     'Damage Function with no pipe removed at all 
        J0 = J                                  'Initializing J0 
        J1 = J                                  'Initializing J1 
    ElseIf chkFlow.Value = vbChecked Then 
        Call RunEPANet2((FireNode), (ThisPipe), IncludeThisPipe(), links, hydrants, f_flow, P_required, 
FN, R_max, InputFile, ReportFile, L_minimum, L_operable, DamageFunction2, Main(), Hydrant(), 
Distance()) 
        J = DamageFunction2                     'Damage Function with no pipe removed at all 
        J0 = J                                  'Initializing J0 
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        J1 = J                                  'Initializing J1 
    End If 
    'Pursuing Dynamic Programming 
    For k = 1 To links  
        MaxFeasibleState = Minimum(k, x_max) 
        For x_k = 0 To MaxFeasibleState  
            For x_k_1 = x_k - 1 To x_k 
  
                'Checking what decisions have been made previously 
                If x_k_1 <> k Then 
                    If x_k_1 >= 0 Then  
                        m = 1 
                        For i = 1 To links 
                            If u_star(x_k_1, k - 1, i) = False Then 
                                u(m) = i 
                                m = m + 1 
                            End If 
                        Next i 
  
                        'Calculating Damage Function 
                        If x_k_1 = x_k Then  
                            J0 = J_star(x_k, k - 1)  
                        Else  
                            u(m) = k              'pipe is removed from the current stage k 
                            For N = 1 To m 
                                For i = 1 To links 
                                    If u(N) = i Then 
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                                        IncludeThisPipe(i) = False 
                                    End If 
                                Next i 
                            Next N 
                     
                            If chkPressure.Value = vbChecked Then 
                                Call RunEPANet1((FireNode), (ThisPipe), IncludeThisPipe(), links, hydrants, f_flow, 
P_required, FN, R_max, InputFile, ReportFile, L_minimum, L_operable, DamageFunction1, Main(), 
Hydrant(), Distance()) 
                                J1 = DamageFunction1 
                            ElseIf chkFlow.Value = vbChecked Then 
                                Call RunEPANet2((FireNode), (ThisPipe), IncludeThisPipe(), links, hydrants, f_flow, 
P_required, FN, R_max, InputFile, ReportFile, L_minimum, L_operable, DamageFunction2, Main(), 
Hydrant(), Distance()) 
                                J1 = DamageFunction2 
                            End If     
                        End If 
  
                        'Resetting IncludeThisPipe() as true 
                        For i = 1 To links 
                            IncludeThisPipe(i) = True 
                        Next i 
  
                        'Updating J_star and u_star 
                        If J0 >= J1 Then  
                            If x_k = 0 Then 
                                J_star(x_k, k) = J 
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                            Else 
                                J_star(x_k, k) = J0 
                            End If 
                     
                            For i = 1 To links  
                                u_star(x_k, k, i) = u_star(x_k, k - 1, i)  
                            Next i  
                        Else  
                            If x_k = 0 Then 
                                J_star(x_k, k) = J 
                            Else 
                                J_star(x_k, k) = J1 
                            End If 
                     
                            For i = 1 To links  
                                If i <> k And x_k > 0 Then 
                                    u_star(x_k, k, i) = u_star(x_k - 1, k - 1, i) 
                                ElseIf x_k = 0 Then  
                                Else 
                                    If x_k <> 0 Then 
                                    u_star(x_k, k, i) = False 
                                    End If 
                                End If  
                            Next i  
                        End If  
                    End If  
                End If  
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            Next x_k_1  
        Next x_k  
    Next k  
     
    'Displaying result in the list box 
    lstDisplay.AddItem "Main ID Optimal Decision" 
    For k = 1 To links 
        If u_star(x_max, links, k) = False Then 
            lstDisplay.AddItem Main(k) & vbTab & CStr(u_star(x_max, links, k)) 
        End If 
    Next k  
    lstDisplay.AddItem "Damage Function for x-max = " & x_max & " is " & J_star(x_max, links)  
     
    'Displaying list of operable nodes 
    Dim ErrorCode As Long 
    Dim nodeindex As Long 
    Dim linkindex As Long 
    Dim node_flow As Single 
    Dim P_node() As Single 
    Dim MyNode As String 
    Dim OperableNode() As Boolean 
    Dim Distance_operable As Single 
    Dim EC As Long 
     
    ReDim P_node(hydrants) 
    ReDim OperableNode(hydrants) 
 
 136
    For i = 1 To hydrants 
        If i <> FN Then 
            If Distance(i) <= R_max Then 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopen(InputFile, ReportFile, "") 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopenH 
                MyNode = RTrim(Hydrant(i)) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodeindex(MyNode, nodeindex) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, node_flow) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, (node_flow + f_flow)) 
                For k = 1 To links 
                    If u_star(x_max, links, k) = False Then 
                        IncludeThisPipe(k) = False 
                        ThisPipe = RTrim(Main(k)) 
                        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetlinkindex(ThisPipe, linkindex) 
                        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetlinkvalue(linkindex, 0, 0.5) 
                    End If 
                Next k 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsolveH() 
                If ErrorCode = 1 Then 
                    OperableNode(i) = False 
                    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose() 
                Else 
                    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 11, P_node(i)) 
                    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose() 
                    If P_node(i) > P_required Then 
                        OperableNode(i) = True 
                        lstDisplay.AddItem i & vbTab & "Operable Node = " & MyNode 
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                    End If 
                End If 
            End If 
        End If 
    Next 
     
    'Resetting IncludeThisPipe() as true 
    For i = 1 To links 
        IncludeThisPipe(i) = True 
    Next i  
             
    'Printing results in output file 
    Open OutputFile For Output As #4  
    If chkPressure.Value = vbChecked Then 
        Print #4, "Checking Pressure" 
    ElseIf chkFlow.Value = vbChecked Then 
        Print #4, "Checking Flow" 
    End If 
     
    Print #4, "Fire Occurs at Node = " & FireNode 
    Print #4, "No. of Pipes Removed = " & x_max 
    Print #4, "Required Pressure for Fire Fighting = 20 psi" 
    Print #4, "Required Flow for Fire Fighting = " & f_flow 
    Print #4, "Main ID" & vbTab & "Optimal Decision" 
    For k = 1 To links 
        If u_star(x_max, links, k) = False Then 
            Print #4, Main(k) & vbTab & CStr(u_star(x_max, links, k)) 
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        End If 
    Next k  
    Print #4, "Damage Function = " & CStr(J_star(x_max, links))  
    Print #4, "Operable Nodes" 
    For i = 1 To hydrants 
        If P_node(i) > P_required Then 
            Print #4, Hydrant(i) 
        End If 
    Next i  
     
    'Checking whether the system is hydraulically balanced or not 
    For k = 1 To links 
        If u_star(x_max, links, k) = False Then 
            IncludeThisPipe(k) = False 
        End If 
    Next k 
    Call RunEPANet3(FireNode, ThisPipe, IncludeThisPipe, links, f_flow, P_required, InputFile, 
ReportFile, Main(), EC) 
    If EC = 1 Then 
        lstDisplay.AddItem "System is Hydraulically Unbalanced" 
        Print #4, "System is Hydraulically Unbalanced" 
    End If  
    Close #4  
End Sub 
 
Private Sub RunEPANet1(ByVal FireNode As String, ThisPipe As String, IncludeThisPipe() As Boolean, 
links As Integer, hydrants As Integer, f_flow As Single, P_required As Integer, FN As Integer, R_max As 
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Integer, InputFile As String, ReportFile As String, L_minimum As Single, L_operable As Single, 
DamageFunction1 As Double, Main() As String * 6, Hydrant() As String * 4, Distance() As Single) 
    Dim ErrorCode As Long 
    Dim nodeindex As Long 
    Dim linkindex As Long 
    Dim P_fnode As Single                 'Pressure at fire node 
    Dim node_flow As Single              'Nodal base demand 
    Dim d As Single                       'd represents a negligible pipe diameter 
    Dim k As Integer 
    Dim alpha, beta, gamma As Single  
     
    d = 0.5  
    gamma = 1 
    beta = 0.01 
    alpha = 1 - beta  
     
    'Opening Toolkit System and Performing Hydraulic Simulation 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopen(InputFile, ReportFile, "") 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopenH 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodeindex(FireNode, nodeindex) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, node_flow) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, (node_flow + f_flow))  
    For k = 1 To links  
        If IncludeThisPipe(k) = False Then 
            ThisPipe = RTrim(Main(k)) 
            ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetlinkindex(ThisPipe, linkindex) 
            ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetlinkvalue(linkindex, 0, d) 
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        End If  
    Next k  
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsolveH() 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 11, P_fnode) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose()  
     
    'Calculating the Damage Function 
    If P_fnode < P_required Then 
        Call OperableNodes((FireNode), f_flow, P_required, links, hydrants, FN, R_max, k, d, L_operable, 
InputFile, ReportFile, ThisPipe, IncludeThisPipe(), Main(), Hydrant(), Distance()) 
         
        If P_fnode <= 0 Then 
            DamageFunction1 = alpha + beta * (L_operable / R_max) 
        Else 
            DamageFunction1 = alpha * (P_required - P_fnode) / P_required + beta * (L_operable / R_max) 
        End If 
         
    ElseIf P_fnode > P_required Then 
        DamageFunction1 = gamma * (P_required - P_fnode) / P_required 
         
    Else 
        DamageFunction1 = 0  
    End If 
End Sub 
 
Private Function Minimum(k As Integer, x_max As Integer) As Integer 
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    If k <= x_max Then 
        Minimum = k 
    Else 
        Minimum = x_max 
    End If  
End Function 
 
Private Sub RunEPANet2(ByVal FireNode As String, ThisPipe As String, IncludeThisPipe() As Boolean, 
links As Integer, hydrants As Integer, f_flow As Single, P_required As Integer, FN As Integer, R_max As 
Integer, InputFile As String, ReportFile As String, L_minimum As Single, L_operable As Single, 
DamageFunction2 As Double, Main() As String * 6, Hydrant() As String * 4, Distance() As Single) 
    Dim ErrorCode As Long 
    Dim nodeindex As Long 
    Dim linkindex As Long 
    Dim P_fnode As Single                 'Pressure at fire node 
    Dim Q_available As Single            'Maximum available flow at fire location 
    Dim node_flow As Single              'Nodal base demand 
    Dim node_elevation As Single         'Nodal Elevation 
    Dim node_emitter As Single           'Emitter coefficient for fire node 
    Dim node_actflow As Single           'Nodal actual demand 
    Dim d As Single                       'd represents a negligible pipe diameter 
    Dim k As Integer 
    Dim alpha, beta, gamma As Single  
     
    d = 0.5  
    gamma = 1 
    beta = 0.01  
 142
    alpha = 1 - beta 
     
     
    'Opening Toolkit System and Performing Hydraulic Simulation 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopen(InputFile, ReportFile, "") 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopenH 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodeindex(FireNode, nodeindex) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 0, node_elevation) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetnodevalue(nodeindex, 0, (node_elevation + 2.3 * P_required)) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 3, node_emitter) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetnodevalue(nodeindex, 3, (node_emitter + 1850))  
    For k = 1 To links  
        If IncludeThisPipe(k) = False Then 
            ThisPipe = RTrim(Main(k)) 
            ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetlinkindex(ThisPipe, linkindex) 
            ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetlinkvalue(linkindex, 0, d) 
        End If  
    Next k  
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsolveH() 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, node_flow) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 9, node_actflow) 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose()  
     
    'Calculating the Damage Function 
    Q_available = node_actflow - node_flow 
             
    If Q_available < f_flow Then 
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        Call OperableNodes((FireNode), f_flow, P_required, links, hydrants, FN, R_max, k, d, L_operable, 
InputFile, ReportFile, ThisPipe, IncludeThisPipe(), Main(), Hydrant(), Distance()) 
        DamageFunction2 = alpha * (f_flow - Q_available) / f_flow + beta * (L_operable / R_max) 
         
    ElseIf Q_available > f_flow Then 
        DamageFunction2 = gamma * (f_flow - Q_available) / f_flow 
         
    Else 
        DamageFunction2 = 0  
    End If  
End Sub 
 
Private Sub OperableNodes(ByVal FireNode As String, f_flow As Single, P_required As Integer, links As 
Integer, hydrants As Integer, FN As Integer, R_max As Integer, k As Integer, d As Single, L_operable As 
Single, InputFile As String, ReportFile As String, ThisPipe As String, IncludeThisPipe() As Boolean, 
Main() As String * 6, Hydrant() As String * 4, Distance() As Single) 
    Dim i As Integer 
    Dim ErrorCode As Long 
    Dim nodeindex As Long 
    Dim linkindex As Long 
    Dim node_flow As Single 
    Dim P_node() As Single           'pressure at node of interest 
    Dim MyNode As String 
    Dim OperableNode() As Boolean 
    Dim Distance_operable As Single 
     
    ReDim P_node(hydrants) 
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    ReDim OperableNode(hydrants)  
         
    'Calculating the distance to the next operable node from the fire node 
    L_operable = 9999999 
    For i = 1 To hydrants 
        If i <> FN Then 
            If Distance(i) <= R_max Then 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopen(InputFile, ReportFile, "") 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopenH 
                MyNode = RTrim(Hydrant(i)) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodeindex(MyNode, nodeindex) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, node_flow) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, (node_flow + f_flow))  
                For k = 1 To links 
                    If IncludeThisPipe(k) = False Then 
                        ThisPipe = RTrim(Main(k)) 
                        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetlinkindex(ThisPipe, linkindex) 
                        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetlinkvalue(linkindex, 0, d) 
                    End If 
                Next k  
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsolveH()  
                If ErrorCode = 1 Then 
                    OperableNode(i) = False 
                    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose() 
                Else 
                    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 11, P_node(i)) 
                    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose() 
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                    If P_node(i) > P_required Then 
                        OperableNode(i) = True 
                        Distance_operable = Distance(i) 
                                  
                        If Distance_operable < L_operable Then 
                            L_operable = Distance_operable 
                        End If 
                         
                    Else 
                        OperableNode(i) = False 
                    End If  
                End If                                              
            End If  
        End If  
    Next i  
End Sub 
 
Private Sub RunEPANet3(ByVal FireNode As String, ThisPipe As String, IncludeThisPipe() As Boolean, 
links As Integer, f_flow As Single, P_required As Integer, InputFile As String, ReportFile As String, 
Main() As String * 6, EC As Long) 
    Dim ErrorCode As Long 
    Dim nodeindex As Long 
    Dim linkindex As Long 
    Dim node_flow As Single              'Nodal base demand 
    Dim node_elevation As Single         'Nodal Elevation 
    Dim node_emitter As Single           'Emitter coefficient for fire node 
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    Dim d As Single                      'd represents a negligible pipe diameter 
    Dim k As Integer 
    Dim alpha, beta, gamma As Single  
     
    d = 0.5 
    'Opening Toolkit System and Performing Hydraulic Simulation 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopen(InputFile, ReportFile, "") 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENopenH 
    ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodeindex(FireNode, nodeindex) 
     
    If chkPressure.Value = vbChecked Then 
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, node_flow) 
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetnodevalue(nodeindex, 1, (node_flow + f_flow))  
        For k = 1 To links  
            If IncludeThisPipe(k) = False Then 
                ThisPipe = RTrim(Main(k)) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetlinkindex(ThisPipe, linkindex) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetlinkvalue(linkindex, 0, d) 
            End If  
        Next k  
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsolveH() 
         
        If ErrorCode = 1 Then 
            EC = ErrorCode 
        End If  
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose() 
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    ElseIf chkFlow.Value = vbChecked Then 
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 0, node_elevation) 
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetnodevalue(nodeindex, 0, (node_elevation + 2.3 * P_required)) 
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetnodevalue(nodeindex, 3, node_emitter) 
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetnodevalue(nodeindex, 3, (node_emitter + 1850))  
        For k = 1 To links  
            If IncludeThisPipe(k) = False Then 
                ThisPipe = RTrim(Main(k)) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENgetlinkindex(ThisPipe, linkindex) 
                ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsetlinkvalue(linkindex, 0, d) 
            End If  
        Next k  
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENsolveH() 
         
        If ErrorCode = 1 Then 
            EC = ErrorCode 
        End If 
         
        ErrorCode = modEPANet.ENclose()  
    End If  
End Sub 
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